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Introduction 
In 2016, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) issued 
proposed rules regarding the use of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration 
clauses in consumer contracts for financial goods and services. One of these 
rules—barring class action waivers in mandatory pre-dispute arbitration 
clauses—attracted substantial attention. Much less noticed was the CFPB’s 
second proposed rule (“Arbitration Reporting Proposal”) requiring 
regulated providers of financial products and services to report to the CFPB 
regarding their use and the outcomes of arbitrations conducted pursuant to 
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses. The Arbitration Reporting 
Proposal also proposed to make such information public, with appropriate 
redactions.
1
 
The American Bar Association Section of Dispute Resolution (“the 
Section”) submitted comments strongly supporting the CFPB’s Arbitration 
Reporting Proposal. In the course of preparing the Section’s comments, it 
also became clear to the author of this Article that dispute resolution 
neutrals and organizations should have an affirmative ethical obligation to 
                                                                                                                 
 1. There have also been legislative efforts to increase the transparency of mandatory 
pre-dispute arbitration. See, e.g., H.R. 832, 115th Cong. (1st Sess. 2017) (also known as the 
“Arbitration Transparency Act”) (proposing to amend section 2 of the Federal Arbitration 
Act to require arbitrations between financial institutions and consumers to be open to the 
public); S. 647, 115th Cong. (1st Sess. 2017) (known as the “Mandatory Arbitration 
Transparency Act”) (proposing to amend Title 9 to ban pre-dispute agreements that provide 
for arbitration of employment, consumer, or civil rights if the agreements bar parties from 
contacting state or federal agencies regarding unlawful conduct or other issues of public 
policy or public concern, deeming such agreements to be “unfair or deceptive act[s] or 
practices” under the Federal Trade Commission Act, instructing the FTC to issue new rules 
and punish violators, and creating a private right of action for aggrieved consumers).  
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support responsible—“measured”—transparency regarding the use and 
outcomes of the processes they provide and promote in order to protect the 
public and these processes’ integrity. Most particularly, dispute resolution 
neutrals (including mediators, arbitrators, ombuds, and providers of online 
dispute resolutions services) should have an ethical obligation to support 
transparency when their processes are imposed upon people pursuant to 
judicial or legislative mandates or by contracts of adhesion, and when the 
outcomes that dispute resolution neutrals help to produce will be granted 
the privileges of narrow and deferential judicial review and expedited 
judicial enforcement.
2
 
                                                                                                                 
 2. Professor Judith Resnik has also recently called for increased transparency 
regarding ADR, observing: 
[H]ere, as part of a larger project addressing the impact of new procedural 
forms, I argue for shaping First Amendment doctrine in light of commitments 
that courts function as open, egalitarian venues. Even if the parties, judges, and 
other neutrals believe in the benefits of closure, and even when parties consent, 
court promotion of ADR, as a matter of constitutional interpretation, ought to 
be accompanied by public accountings of what transpires. . . . [T]he presence of 
the state infuses all these forms of ADR, which are mandated, advocated, and 
structured through hundreds of court rules, government manuals, and websites, 
and are commended to litigants by judges. The result of these many new rules 
is not “bargaining in the shadow of the law,” but bargaining as a requirement of 
the law. . . . As procedure is increasingly becoming contract, state-promoted 
contracting—produced at the behest of the state and shaped through judicial 
intervention—needs regulation through public oversight and participation. . . . 
The issue is which activities ought to have what Justice Brennan termed the 
“public character of judicial proceedings.”. . . Chief Justice Burger, writing for 
the plurality in [Richmond Newspapers], spoke about the “nexus between 
openness, fairness, and the perception of fairness.” He commented further that 
“[p]eople in an open society do not demand infallibility from their institutions, 
but it is difficult for them to accept what they are prohibited from 
observing.”. . . When [judges] convene meetings in courts, when they take on 
the role of “neutrals” or authorize others to do so with “quasi-judicial” status, 
their decisions and their procedures are the state, in action. As more of the 
activity of “the judicial” moves to become “quasi-judicial,” the public needs to 
be built in, so as to be able to be present [for] at least some aspects of the 
proceedings and to know the results. 
Judith Resnik, The Contingency of Openness in Courts: Changing the Experiences and 
Logics of the Public’s Role in Court-Based ADR, 15 NEV. L. J. 1631, 1683-85 (2015) 
(quoting Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 570, 572, 592 (1980)) 
[hereinafter Resnik, The Contingency of Openness]; see also Laurie Kratky Dore, Public 
Courts Versus Private Justice: It’s Time to Let Some Sun Shine in on Alternative Dispute 
Resolution, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 463, 465-66 (2006) (suggesting that courts’ increased 
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Now is a particularly good time to consider the ethical obligations of one 
set of dispute resolution neutrals: mediators. This is because the Section, 
the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”), and the Association for 
Conflict Resolution (“ACR”) are currently considering whether to review 
and revise the Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators. Courts and 
legislatures regularly mandate parties’ participation in mediation. 
Mandatory pre-dispute mediation clauses are now turning up in the same 
contracts that contain mandatory pre-dispute consumer arbitration clauses.
3
 
Courts reliably enforce mediated settlement agreements, generally with 
little review.
4
 Mediation is also the subject of substantial recent 
international activity. On December 20, 2018, the United Nations General 
Assembly adopted an international convention for the expedited 
enforcement of mediated settlement agreements. The convention will be 
open for signatures in Singapore in August 2019.
5
 
                                                                                                                 
commitment to transparency may have had the unintended effect of diverting more cases to 
arbitration and mediation); David Horton, Arbitration as Delegation, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 
485, 494 (2011) (pointing to delegation of legislative power to a private party, also pointing 
out lack of transparency, opacity); Judith Resnik, A2J/A2K: Access to Justice, Access to 
Knowledge, and Economic Inequalities in Open Courts and Arbitrations, 96 N.C. L. REV. 
605, 629-30 (2018) [hereinafter Resnik, A2J] (“My focus is on the impact of these shifts to 
[mediation, arbitration, early neutral evaluation, ODR, and settlement] on access to 
knowledge about justice-seeking [processes].”). 
 3. See Alliance for Justice, Lost in the Fine Print (HD), YOUTUBE (Oct. 6, 2014), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tgC3N802Sjk (picturing a contract that includes a 
mediation clause just before the arbitration clause). 
 4. See James R. Coben, Creating a 21st Century Oligarchy: Judicial Abdication to 
Class Action Mediators, 5 Y.B. ARB. & MEDIATION 162, 168-69 (2013) (describing cases in 
which courts state that class action settlements are entitled to a presumption of fairness if 
they were reached in mediation); Nancy A. Welsh, The Thinning Vision of Self-
Determination in Court-Connected Mediation: The Inevitable Price of Institutionalization?, 
6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 59-78 (2001) [hereinafter Welsh, Thinning Vision]; James R. 
Coben & Peter N. Thompson, Disputing Irony: A Systematic Look at Litigation About 
Mediation, 11 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 43, 74 (2006). 
 5. The United Nations Convention on International Settlement Agreements Resulting 
from Mediation will be known as the "Singapore Convention on Mediation." See General 
Assembly Adopts the United Nations Convention on International Settlement Agreements 
Resulting from Mediation at http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/en/pressrels/2018/ 
unisl271.html. The Singapore Convention is modeled upon the New York Convention, 
which requires signatory nations’ courts to recognize and enforce international commercial 
arbitration awards with only narrow grounds for the denial of such enforcement. Article 1 of 
the Singapore Convention specifically excludes employment, family, and consumer matters. 
See REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW ON THE 
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This Article will begin by describing the event that triggered the 
Section’s consideration of transparency—the CFPB’s announcement of its 
Arbitration Reporting Proposal. The Article will also detail the Proposal’s 
subsequent history, including its promulgation and repeal. The Article will 
then turn to the transparency that exists or has been proposed for various 
dispute resolution processes. For example, the Article will consider the 
transparency that (1) federal and state courts provide regarding their court 
filings and outcomes; (2) some states, some federal agencies, and some 
domestic and international dispute resolution organizations now require or 
provide regarding the use and outcomes of arbitration (and to a lesser 
degree, mediation); (3) some users of dispute resolution achieve through 
“self-help” initiatives; and (4) some commentators have proposed for online 
dispute resolution. Finally, the Article will consider whether the ethical 
principles that currently apply to mediators establish an affirmative ethical 
obligation to support transparency, at least under certain circumstances. 
Concluding that the Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators do not 
establish such an ethical obligation, the Article will end with a proposal to 
establish mediators’ ethical obligation to support transparency to a 
responsible degree when mediations are mandated by courts, legislatures, or 
contracts of adhesion and the resulting mediated settlement agreements are 
subject to only narrow and deferential judicial review or are granted 
expedited judicial enforcement. In particular, the Article will argue for the 
creation of a set of customized Model Standards for “imposed mediation.”  
I. The Precipitating Event: The CFPB’s Arbitration Reporting Proposal 
The use of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements in consumer 
transactions and employment contracts has elicited substantial controversy 
in the general public, the courts, and the dispute resolution field. It has also 
been the subject of countless articles in law reviews
6
 and professional 
journals.
7
 
                                                                                                                 
WORK OF ITS FIFTY-FIRST SESSION: REPORT OF THE SIXTH COMMITTEE 11 (Nov. 7, 2018) at 
https://undocs.org/en/A/73/496. The UNCITRAL Working Group’s documents regarding 
the Singapore Convention are available at Working Group II: 2000 to Present: Arbitration 
and Conciliation / Dispute Settlement, UNCITRAL, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/ 
en/commission/working_groups/2Arbitration.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2018). For additional 
resources regarding the Singapore Convention, see infra note 153. 
 6. Regarding the general topic of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration in a disparate party 
context, see, for example, Hiro N. Aragaki, The Federal Arbitration Act as Procedural 
Reform, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1939 (2014); Lisa Blomgren Amsler, Combating Structural Bias 
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in Dispute System Designs that Use Arbitration: Transparency, the Universal Sanitizer, 6 
Y.B. ARB. & MEDIATION 32 (2014); Lisa Blomgren Bingham, Designing Justice: Legal 
Institutions and Other Systems for Managing Conflict, 24 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 5–6 
(2008); Sarah Rudolph Cole, Revising the FAA to Permit Expanded Judicial Review of 
Arbitration Awards, 8 NEV. L.J. 214 (2007); Paul F. Kirgis, Judicial Review and the Limits 
of Arbitral Authority: Lessons from the Law of Contract, 81 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 99 (2007); 
Darren P. Lindamood, Comment, Redressing the Arbitration Process: An Alternative to the 
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 291 (2010); Victor D. 
Quintanilla & Alexander B. Avtgis, The Public Believes Binding Arbitration Clauses Are 
Unjust: Ethical Implications for Dispute System Design in the Time of Vanishing Trials, 85 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2119, 2146 (2017) (reporting empirical research showing that as members 
of the public learn more about mandatory pre-dispute arbitration, the more they believe it to 
be unjust and illegitimate, and urging the adoption of a more inclusive, more virtuous ethical 
ideal for transactional attorneys to encourage them to “craft and design adhesion contracts 
[that] balance both the interests of their client with the needs and perspective of the public”); 
Richard C. Reuben, Democracy and Dispute Resolution: The Problem of Arbitration, 67 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 279 (2004); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Keeping Arbitrations from 
Becoming Kangaroo Courts, 8 NEV. L.J. 251 (2007); Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping 
Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631 (2005); Stephen J. Ware, The 
Centrist Case for Enforcing Adhesive Arbitration Agreements, 23 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 29 
(2017); Maureen A. Weston, The Other Avenues of Hall Street and Prospects for Judicial 
Review of Arbitral Awards, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 929 (2010). 
Regarding mandatory pre-dispute consumer arbitration in particular, see Sarah R. Cole & 
Kristen M. Blankley, Empirical Research on Consumer Arbitration: What the Data Reveals, 
113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1051 (2009); Sarah Rudolph Cole, On Babies and Bathwater: The 
Arbitration Fairness Act and the Supreme Court’s Recent Arbitration Jurisprudence, 48 
HOUS. L. REV. 457 (2011); Christopher R. Drahozal & Samantha Zyontz, Creditor Claims in 
Arbitration and in Court, 7 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 77 (2011); Theodore Eisenberg et al., 
Arbitration’s Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and 
Non-Consumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 871, 871 (2008); Myriam Gilles, 
Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the Modern Class Action, 
104 MICH. L. REV. 373 (2005); Jill I. Gross, Justice Scalia’s Hat Trick and the Supreme 
Court’s Flawed Understanding of Twenty-First Century Arbitration, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 111 
(2015); David Horton & Andrea Cann Chandrasekher, After the Revolution: An Empirical 
Study of Consumer Arbitration, 104 GEO. L.J. 57 (2015); Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: 
The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 
124 YALE L.J. 2804 (2015) [hereinafter Resnik, Diffusing Disputes]; Amy J. Schmitz, 
Curing Consumers’ Warranty Woes Through Regulated Arbitration, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. 
RESOL. 627 (2008); Amy J. Schmitz, Legislating in the Light: Considering Empirical Data 
in Crafting Arbitration Reforms, 15 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 115 (2010); Jeff Sovern et al., 
“Whimsy Little Contracts” with Unexpected Consequences: An Empirical Analysis of 
Consumer Understanding of Arbitration Agreements, 75 MD. L. REV. 1 (2015); Jean R. 
Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration Clauses Prevent Consumers from Presenting 
Procedurally Difficult Claims, 42 SW. L. REV. 87 (2012); Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: 
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion Impedes Access to Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703 (2012); 
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As part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”), Congress specifically authorized the CFPB to 
issue regulations that would “prohibit or impose conditions or limitations” 
on mandatory pre-dispute consumer arbitration clauses in contracts for 
                                                                                                                 
THOMAS J. STIPANOWICH ET AL., AM. BAR ASS’N, NATIONAL ROUNDTABLE ON CONSUMER 
AND EMPLOYMENT DISPUTE RESOLUTION: CONSUMER ARBITRATION ROUNDTABLE SUMMARY 
REPORT (2012), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/dispute_ 
resolution/roundtable2012.authcheckdam.pdf; Nancy A. Welsh, Class Action-Barring 
Mandatory Pre-Dispute Consumer Arbitration Clauses: An Example of (and Opportunity 
for) Dispute System Design?, 13 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 381 (2017) [hereinafter Welsh, Class 
Action-Barring Mandatory Pre-Dispute Consumer Arbitration Clauses]; Nancy A. Welsh, 
Mandatory Predispute Consumer Arbitration, Structural Bias, and Incentivizing Procedural 
Safeguards, 42 SW. L. REV. 187 (2012) [hereinafter Welsh, Mandatory Predispute Consumer 
Arbitration]; Nancy A. Welsh, What Is “(Im)partial Enough” in a World of Embedded 
Neutrals?, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 395 (2010) [hereinafter Welsh, What Is “(Im)partial Enough”]; 
Christopher R. Drahozal & Samantha Zyontz, Private Regulation of Consumer Arbitration 
44–45 (Univ. of Kan. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 2011-4) [hereinafter Drahozal & 
Zyontz, Private Regulation]. 
Regarding mandatory pre-dispute employment arbitration, see Michael Z. Green, 
Debunking the Myth of Employer Advantage from Using Mandatory Arbitration for 
Employment Discrimination Claims, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 399, 454–59 (2000); Michael Z. 
Green, Measures to Encourage and Reward Post-Dispute Agreements to Arbitrate 
Employment Discrimination Claims, 8 NEV. L.J. 59 (2007); Martin H. Malin, The 
Arbitration Fairness Act: It Need Not and Should Not Be an All or Nothing Proposition, 87 
IND. L.J. 289, 312 (2012); Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Arbitration Fairness Index: Using a 
Public Rating System to Skirt the Legal Logjam and Promote Fairer and More Effective 
Arbitration of Employment and Consumer Disputes, 60 KAN. L. REV. 985 (2012) 
[hereinafter Stipanowich, The Arbitration Fairness Index]. 
Regarding mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses in social media agreements, see 
Michael L. Rustad et al., An Empirical Study of Predispute Mandatory Arbitration Clauses 
in Social Media Terms of Service Agreements, 34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 643 (2012); 
Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Fundamentally Unfair: An Empirical Analysis of 
Social Media Arbitration Clauses, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 341 (2014). 
 7. See, e.g., Sarah Rudolph Cole & Theodore H. Frank, The Current State of Consumer 
Arbitration, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 2008, at 30; David B. Lipsky, The New York Times’ 
Attack on Arbitration, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Summer 2016, at 6; Lisa Renee Pomerantz, 
Consumer Arbitration: Pre-Dispute Resolution Clauses and Class Action Waivers, 
ACRESOLUTION MAG., Fall 2015, at 16; Nancy A. Welsh & David B. Lipsky, “Moving the 
Ball Forward” in Consumer and Employment Dispute Resolution: What Can Planning, 
Talking, Listening and Breaking Bread Together Accomplish?, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Spring 
2013, at 14 [hereinafter Welsh & Lipsky, “Moving the Ball Forward”]; Nancy A. Welsh & 
Stephan J. Ware, Ross et al. v. American Express et al.: The Story Behind the Spread of 
Class Action-Barring Arbitration Clauses in Credit Card Agreements, DISP. RESOL. MAG., 
Fall 2014, at 18. 
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financial products or services as long as the CFPB found that doing so was 
“in the public interest and for the protection of consumers.”8 Congress also 
required the CFPB to conduct a study of mandatory arbitration. Any 
regulatory findings made by the CFPB had to be consistent with the study.
9
 
The CFPB conducted its empirical study and issued its final, voluminous 
report in March 2015 (“March 2015 Report”).10 In May 2016, the CFPB 
announced its proposed rules.
11
 
One portion of the CFPB’s proposed rules—in which the CFPB barred 
class action waivers in mandatory pre-dispute consumer arbitration 
clauses—garnered substantial attention. The other portion of the CFPB’s 
proposed rules—section 1040.4(b), or the Arbitration Reporting Proposal—
remained largely under the radar. This portion dealt with the issue of 
transparency. The CFPB proposed to require regulated providers of 
financial products and services to report information regarding their use and 
the outcomes of arbitrations conducted pursuant to mandatory pre-dispute 
arbitration clauses. Specifically, the Arbitration Reporting Proposal 
required submission, with redaction of individuals’ names and other 
information, of the following five types of documents: 
(1) the initial claim (whether filed by a consumer or by the 
provider) and any counterclaim; (2) the pre-dispute arbitration 
agreement filed with the arbitrator or arbitration administrator; 
(3) the award, if any, issued by the arbitrator or arbitration 
administrator; (4) any communications from the arbitrator or 
arbitration administrator with whom the claim was filed relating 
to a refusal to administer or dismissal of a claim due to the 
                                                                                                                 
 8. 12 U.S.C. § 5518 (2012). The Dodd-Frank Act also amended the Truth in Lending 
Act to impose a ban on the use of mandatory arbitration clauses in certain residential 
mortgage loan agreements. 
 9. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, SMALL BUSINESS ADVISORY REVIEW PANEL FOR 
POTENTIAL RULEMAKING ON ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS: OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS UNDER 
CONSIDERATION AND ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED (2015), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/ 
f/201510_cfpb_small-business-review-panel-packet-explaining-the-proposal-under-
consideration.pdf [hereinafter CFPB, SMALL BUSINESS ADVISORY REVIEW PANEL FOR 
POTENTIAL RULEMAKING ON ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS]. 
 10. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO CONGRESS, 
PURSUANT TO DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT § 
1028(A) (2015), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitration-study-report-to-
congress-2015.pdf [hereinafter CFPB Report]. 
 11. This step was preceded by the CFPB’s submission of its tentative proposed rules to 
a Small Business Review Panel in November 2015.  
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provider’s failure to pay required fees; and (5) any 
communications related to a determination that an arbitration 
agreement does not comply with the administrator’s fairness 
principles.
12
 
The CFPB also proposed to publish these materials on its website in some 
form, with appropriate redaction or aggregation.
13
  
For most of the CFPB’s proposed requirements, the agency’s reasoning 
was, and remains, fairly apparent. However, the required reporting of 
communications regarding failure to comply with dispute resolution 
administrators’ fairness principles deserves further explanation. In April 
1998, the AAA’s National Consumer Disputes Advisory Committee 
produced A Due Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of 
Consumer Disputes to guide the use of ADR processes to resolve consumer 
disputes.
14
 The Protocol’s Statement of Principles asserted parties’ 
                                                                                                                 
 12. Arbitration Agreements, 81 Fed. Reg. 32,830, 32,868-69 (proposed May 24, 2016) 
(to be codified at 12 C.R.F. pt. 1040). 
 13. See id.; see also CFPB, SMALL BUSINESS ADVISORY REVIEW PANEL FOR POTENTIAL 
RULEMAKING ON ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS, supra note 9, at 20 (“The Bureau is considering 
a proposal to require covered entities that use arbitration agreements in their contracts with 
consumers to submit initial claim filings and written awards in consumer finance arbitration 
proceedings to the Bureau through a process the Bureau would expect to establish as part of 
this rulemaking. The Bureau is also considering whether to publish the claims or awards to 
its website, making them available to the public. Before collecting or publishing any arbitral 
claims or awards, the Bureau would ensure that these activities comply with privacy 
considerations.”) The CFPB anticipates that regulated entities would be required to submit to 
the Bureau “an electronic file with documents that the entity already possesses” that may 
also be redacted. Id. at 25.  
The CFPB currently makes data publicly available regarding the complaints it receives 
from consumers about financial services companies’ alleged unfair, deceptive, or abusive 
acts or processes. Researchers have used this database in order to identify demographic 
differences in consumer complaints and in companies’ responses to consumer complaints. 
See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Jeff Lingwall & Sonia Steinway, Skeletons in the Database: An Early 
Analysis of the CFPB’s Consumer Complaints, 19 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 343, 363-67 
(2014) (reporting that mortgage complaints per mortgage were significantly higher in ZIP 
codes with larger proportions of African Americans, Latinos, and senior citizens, and that 
companies were less timely in responding to consumers located in areas with higher 
concentrations of college students). 
 14. See NAT’L CONSUMER DISPUTES ADVISORY COMM., AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, 
CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES 1, 1-3 (1998), 
https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/document_repository/Consumer%20Due%20Process
%20Protocol%20(1).pdf [hereinafter CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL STATEMENT OF 
PRINCIPLES]; see also AM. BAR ASS’N, ADDRESSING DISPUTES IN ELECTRONIC COMMERCE: 
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entitlement to a “fundamentally-fair ADR process,” with the Principles 
serving as “embodiments of fundamental fairness.”15 The Protocol 
provided, among other things, for “independent and impartial” neutrals and 
administration; consumers’ continued access to small claims court; 
reasonable costs for consumers (including consideration of their ability to 
pay); “arbitrator-supervised exchange of information”; consumers’ access 
to all remedies available in courts of law and equity; and consumers’ access 
(upon request) to written explanations of arbitral awards.
16
 The Protocol 
also strongly encouraged the use of mediation.
17
 It did not address class 
action waivers. The AAA subsequently conditioned its provision of service 
upon compliance with the Protocol
18
 and, over the years, has been removed 
                                                                                                                 
FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION’S TASK FORCE 
ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE AND ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 36 n.50 (2002); Resnik, 
Diffusing Disputes, supra note 6, at 2852–53 (observing that the AAA’s decisions to 
produce the protocol “imposing fee schedules with caps, to create ethical standards, and to 
revise its rules and fee schedules” represented “matters of ‘internal policy’” while other self-
regulatory initiatives—like the adoption of ethical principles, the commitment to diversity, 
and information disclosure and dissemination—also represent “choices” that are not 
universally followed by ADR providers; also reporting that many social media arbitration 
clauses do “not meet the ‘due process fairness tests’ of the AAA”). 
 15. CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES, supra note 14, at 1, 
9. 
 16. Id. at 1–3. 
 17. Id. at 2. The complete list of principles contained in the Protocol are: 
1. Fundamentally fair process 
2. Access to information regarding ADR program 
3. Independent and impartial neutral; independent administration 
4. Quality and competence of neutrals 
5. Small claims 
6. Reasonable cost 
7. Reasonably convenient location 
8. Reasonable time limits 
9. Right to representation 
10. Mediation 
11. Agreements to arbitrate 
12. Arbitration hearings 
13. Access to information 
14. Arbitral remedies 
15. Arbitration awards 
Id. at 1–3. The Protocol does not address class action waivers. 
 18. See AAA Statement of Ethical Principles, AM. ARB. ASS’N, https://www.adr.org/ 
StatementofEthicalPrinciples (last visited Dec. 11, 2018). It provides: 
! For consumer cases with claims under $75,000, the AAA reviews the 
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from some consumer agreements due to businesses’ unwillingness to abide 
by the principles contained in the Protocol.
19
 Presumably, such removals 
involved communications regarding the AAA’s determination that the 
businesses’ consumer arbitration clauses did not meet the requirements of 
the Due Process Protocol. The CFPB proposed to require the submission of 
these communications.
20
 
The ABA Section of Dispute Resolution had examined mandatory pre-
dispute consumer arbitration at various points over the years.
21
 With some 
limited exceptions for particular applications,
22
 the Section’s Council had 
                                                                                                                 
contract clause to determine if it substantially and materially deviates 
from the Consumer Due Process Protocol. The AAA reserves the right 
to refuse to administer arbitrations with consumer clauses that violate 
the Consumer Due Process Protocol. 
! Pursuant to the AAA's National Rules for the Resolution of Employment 
Disputes, employers submit pre-dispute, corporate employment 
programs naming the AAA to the AAA for review to determine that the 
programs do not substantially and materially deviate from the 
Employment Due Process Protocol. The AAA reserves the right to 
decline its administrative services if the employer does not submit its 
plan for review or if the program does not comply with the Due Process 
Protocol. 
Id.; see also Drahozal & Zyontz, Private Regulation, supra note 6, at 91 (reporting the 
results of first empirical study of the AAA’s enforcement of its Consumer Due Process 
Protocol and finding that the AAA’s review of arbitration clauses for protocol compliance 
appears to be effective at identifying and responding to those clauses with protocol 
violations); Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 6, at 91 (observing that the “prophylactic 
steps” resulting from the AAA’s adoption and enforcement of its Consumer Due Process 
Protocols may make the AAA “more amenable to consumer plaintiffs than other venues”); 
STIPANOWICH ET AL., supra note 6, at 48 (“Importantly, AAA reviews arbitration clauses for 
their compliance with the Due Process Protocol. When AAA has found deviation from the 
Protocol, it has rejected cases or has required the company to agree to correct deficiencies.”). 
 19. See CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES, supra note 14, 
at 11. 
 20. Id. at 10. 
 21. See, e.g., Herbert M. Kritzer, To Regulate or Not to Regulate, or (Better Still) When 
to Regulate, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2013, at 12 (part of a themed issue entitled 
“Considering Regulation of ADR”); STIPANOWICH ET AL., supra note 6; SECTION OF DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION, AM. BAR ASS’N, REPORT OF THE DISCUSSION OF THE CONSUMER ARBITRATION 
STUDY GROUP (2010).  
 22. For example, the Section’s Council voted to support a proposed ABA House of 
Delegates resolution (Resolution 111B) opposing the use of mandatory, binding, pre-dispute 
arbitration agreements between nursing homes and residents or their agents and supporting 
legislation and regulations invalidating such arbitration agreements. The House of Delegates 
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been unable to achieve a general consensus on whether to support or oppose 
mandatory pre-dispute consumer arbitration.
23
 Due to the importance of the 
CFPB’s proposed rules to the dispute resolution field, however, the Section 
decided to try again. The Section’s Council established a CFPB Review 
Task Force, composed of experienced and well-respected dispute resolution 
practitioners and academics knowledgeable regarding mandatory pre-
dispute arbitration (particularly consumer arbitration),
24
 to review the 
CFPB’s proposals25 and provide advice to the Section. The subsequent 
deliberations of the Section’s Executive Committee and Council were 
informed by the Task Force’s report.26 
After such deliberations, the Section’s Council voted to express its 
strong support for the CFPB’s Arbitration Reporting Proposal. In comments 
submitted to the CFPB in July 2016,
27
 the Section noted the current lack of 
complete and consistent information regarding consumer arbitration and the 
need for such information. The Section referenced the CFPB’s March 2015 
report, in which the agency concluded that although it had a “reasonably 
complete picture of the claims that consumers are willing to file in 
arbitration where arbitration is an available option,”28 its analysis was 
                                                                                                                 
adopted this resolution in February 2009. More recently, the Section’s Council also voted to 
support a proposed ABA House of Delegates resolution (Resolution 300) urging legal 
employers not to require mandatory arbitration of claims of sexual harassment. The House of 
Delegates adopted this resolution in August 2019. 
 23. See Welsh, Class Action-Barring Mandatory Pre-Dispute Consumer Arbitration 
Clauses, supra note 6, at 381-86 (describing history of Section’s attempts to develop a 
policy and protocols on mandatory pre-dispute consumer arbitration); Welsh & Lipsky, 
“Moving the Ball Forward,” supra note 7, at 14 (describing position taken by Section 
Council on Arbitration Fairness Act and its aftermath). 
 24. The CFPB Review Task Force consisted of Nancy Welsh (Chair), Lisa Amsler, 
Louis Burke, Ben Davis, Homer Larue, Bruce Meyerson, Lawrence Mills, Peter Phillips, 
Colin Rule, Jean Sternlight, Thomas Stipanowich, and Beth Trent. 
 25. At this point, the CFPB had released tentative proposals as part of a review by the 
Small Business Review Panel. See CFPB, SMALL BUSINESS ADVISORY REVIEW PANEL FOR 
POTENTIAL RULEMAKING ON ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS, supra note 9 (regarding Small 
Business Review Panel). 
 26. WELSH ET AL., CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, REPORT TO THE COUNCIL OF THE 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION SECTION FROM THE CFPB REVIEW TASK FORCE (on file with author). 
 27. Pursuant to Council direction, the Section sought and won permission from the 
ABA (through its “blanket authority” procedure) to submit comments to the CFPB. See 
Nancy A. Welsh, ABA Section of Dispute Resolution, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule of 
Arbitration Agreements (July 29, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=CFPB-
2016-0020-5905 [hereinafter Welsh, Comment Letter]. 
 28. CFPB REPORT, supra note 10, § 5.1, at 4. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol71/iss3/4
2019]    OBLIGATION TO SUPPORT MEASURED TRANSPARENCY   835 
 
 
subject to limitations. To a large extent, these limitations derived from the 
paucity of complete and consistent information regarding the numbers, 
types of claims, outcomes, arbitrators, parties, and party representatives 
involved in arbitrations conducted pursuant to mandatory pre-dispute 
consumer arbitration clauses. The Section concluded that “despite the 
prevalence of mandatory pre-dispute consumer arbitration clauses, the 
public generally has little information regarding use of the process or its 
outcomes.”29 
Specifically, the Section noted that the CFPB had been forced to rely on 
data from a single source—the AAA—that “voluntarily provided its case 
filings to the CFPB pursuant to a non-disclosure agreement.”30 While there 
was “substantial evidence that the AAA dominate[d] the administration of 
consumer financial arbitration cases[,]”31 the CFPB had pointed out in its 
March 2015 report that other dispute resolution organizations also 
administered consumer financial arbitration.
32
 The Section found it 
significant that “only 18.3% of storefront payday-loan contracts, 16.7% of 
private student loan contracts, and 37.3% of prepaid cards studied by the 
CFPB provided for the AAA as the sole administrator, while most contracts 
identified the AAA as either the sole administrator or one of the available 
choices.”33 The CFPB had noted that “the types of claims handled by other 
providers might differ from the claims evidenced in the AAA filings, but 
due to the lack of required reporting, the CFPB had no means to determine 
whether such differences existed.”34 As a result, “the AAA might not be the 
                                                                                                                 
 29. Welsh, Comment Letter, supra note 27, at 2. 
 30. Id. at 2-3. 
 31. Id. at 3, 10 n.10 (“[T]he AAA is specified as at least one potential choice of 
contractually-specified arbitration administrators in 98.5% of the credit card market we 
studied; 98.9% of the checking account market we studied; 100% of the GPR prepaid card 
market we studied; 85.5% of the storefront payday loan market we studied; and 66.7% of the 
private student loan agreements we reviewed. The AAA is specified as the sole choice in 
17.9% of the GPR prepaid card market that we studied; 44.6% of the checking account 
market we studied; and one of the private student loan agreements we reviewed. With that 
said . . . when we reviewed the court records of class cases in which parties moved to 
compel arbitration, we found five records indicating a subsequent filing with the AAA and 
four indicating a filing in JAMS.” (quoting CFPB REPORT, supra note 10, § 5.1, at 4 n.5)). 
 32. Id. at 3, 10 n.11 (“The CFPB specifically named JAMS, Inc., but it is very likely 
that there are also other dispute resolution providers handling these cases.”). 
 33. Id. at 3 (citing CFPB REPORT, supra note 10, § 2.5.3, at 35-39).  
 34. Id. 
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dominant administrator of arbitration in consumer financial contexts that 
were not studied by the CFPB.”35 
The CFPB acknowledged other difficulties with the data upon which it 
relied for its report, including the following shortcomings: ambiguity in 
defining what should count as a “win” for a consumer or company; a lack 
of information regarding the cases in which arbitrators did not make awards 
or in which the parties settled;
36
 and a lack of information regarding the 
outcomes of cases that did not proceed to arbitration or did not result in 
awards. 
Ultimately, the Section was troubled by the lack of complete and 
consistent information regarding consumer arbitration and believed there 
was a need for such information. 
The Section also found that the experience of quasi-public dispute 
resolution organizations, private organizations, and states demonstrated the 
value of collecting and publishing arbitration-related information, suggested 
specific information that would benefit from disclosure, and evidenced a 
developing trend toward transparency. The Section acknowledged that 
some dispute resolution professionals and organizations had raised 
legitimate concerns regarding the costs of complying with the CFPB’s 
Arbitration Reporting Requirement
37
 and the potential loss of 
confidentiality for processes that many describe as “private” dispute 
resolution. Nonetheless, the Section urged that transparency was essential 
to protect the integrity of arbitration and that: 
[the] reporting and publication proposed by the CFPB—and the 
consequent availability of the information for those participating 
in consumer arbitration, those researching consumer arbitration, 
and those overseeing consumer arbitration—will help to protect 
the integrity of arbitration and, by extension, the integrity of the 
                                                                                                                 
 35. Id. 
 36. CFPB REPORT, supra note 10, § 5.1, at 5-6 (observing that most state and federal 
courts also do not require reporting regarding settlements). 
 37.  See, e.g., Letter from Nessa Feddis, Vice President & Senior Counsel, Ctr. for 
Regulatory Compliance, Am. Bankers Ass’n; Steven I. Zeisel, Exec. Vice President & Gen. 
Counsel, Consumer Bankers Ass’n; and K. Richard Foster, Senior Vice President & Senior 
Counsel for Regulatory & Legal Affairs, Fin. Servs. Roundtable, to Richard Cordray, Dir., 
CFPB (Aug. 22, 2016). 
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strong federal policy in favor of arbitration that has been 
expressed by the Supreme Court.
38
 
The Section then specifically identified the use of arbitration at issue here 
and explained the factors that demanded modification of the usual 
understanding of arbitration as a “creature of contract” that could and 
should be entirely private.  
[T]ransparency is particularly important when, as here, one of 
the parties to a dispute is imposing a dispute resolution process 
upon the other party and the courts may be asked to enforce—
and thus lend their coercive power and legitimacy to—the award 
produced by the process.
39
 
In sum, the Section strongly supported the CFPB’s proposal to require 
regulated entities to submit arbitration claim filings, awards, and other 
documents to the CFPB, and to publish such information. The Section also 
urged the CFPB to consider how quasi-public and private organizations had 
structured their databases to ensure easy access, searchability, and an 
overall sense of the dispute resolution system and its outcomes. The Section 
was particularly struck by those organizations that provided for both an 
online searchable database of individual awards and useful aggregated data 
(including data regarding mediation and different types of arbitral panels).  
The Section also proposed a few modifications, based on the importance 
of assuring parties and the public that “individual arbitrators and dispute 
resolution providers offer an effective and impartial forum.”40 Regarding 
impartiality, the Section advocated for a searchable database of claim 
filings and awards that would reveal the number of times that a regulated 
entity had been a party in an arbitration filed with or administered by a 
particular dispute resolution provider, the number of times that a regulated 
entity’s arbitration had been conducted by a particular arbitrator, and the 
number of times that particular lawyers had represented clients in such 
arbitrations and before particular arbitrators. Thus, a searchable database 
would reveal repeat players of various types and potential conflicts of 
                                                                                                                 
 38. Welsh, Comment Letter, supra note 27, at 2. Notably, defenders of arbitration have 
also remarked upon “the need for more thorough empirical research into the dynamics of 
arbitration specifically and the resolution of disputes more generally.” Peter B. Rutledge, 
Who Can Be Against Fairness? The Case Against the Arbitration Fairness Act, 9 CARDOZO 
J. CONFLICT RESOL. 267, 281 (2008). 
 39. Welsh, Comment Letter, supra note 27, at 8. 
 40. Id. 
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interest. The database proposed by the CFPB did not, however, include 
information regarding “prior mediation experience with a particular dispute 
resolution organization or neutral, or the financial interests that might exist 
among dispute resolution organizations, parties, and legal 
representatives.”41 The Section urged the CFPB to require disclosure 
regarding such prior experience and relationships to further assist with 
protecting the impartiality, effectiveness, and integrity of arbitration, and 
recommended considering the experience of the states in requiring 
disclosures regarding prior mediations
42
 and financial interests that might 
represent conflicts of interest. Finally, the Section urged the CFPB to 
consider specifying the mechanisms it would use to enforce its reporting 
requirements.  
The election of Donald Trump as President in November 2016 
apparently scuttled any chance that the CFPB’s proposed rules would be 
made effective.
43
 Nonetheless, on July 10, 2017, the CFPB announced its 
new rule barring mandatory pre-dispute consumer arbitration clauses that 
included class action waivers and requiring the reporting of arbitration 
claim filings, pre-dispute arbitration agreements, awards, and 
communications regarding compliance with fairness principles and 
payment requirements.
44
 The rule also provided for making such 
information public after appropriate aggregation or redaction.
45
  
There were only a few differences between the Arbitration Reporting 
Proposal and the final rule announced in July 2017. Most notably, the 
CFPB had added two more reporting requirements. Providers of financial 
services and goods would be required to submit the answer to any initial 
claim or counterclaim and, “[i]n connection with any case in court by or 
                                                                                                                 
 41. Id. (emphasis added). 
 42. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Do the “Haves” Come Out Ahead in Alternative 
Judicial Systems?: Repeat Players in ADR, 15 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 19, 34 n.71 (1999) 
(“Beyond the use of one ADR firm as a repeat provider, this law firm represented to me that 
a single mediator had been used over 300 times in one year! The repeat play law firm (by 
specialty) was able to maximize its use of a single repeat play mediator. So far, neither ethics 
regulations nor other rules require the law firm or the mediator to disclose to one-shot 
litigants that he had performed for this firm before.”). 
 43. See Welsh, Class Action-Barring Mandatory Pre-Dispute Consumer Arbitration 
Clauses, supra note 6, at 431 (expressing doubts regarding the likelihood that the CFPB 
would announce final rules). 
 44.  Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. 33,210, 33,210 (July 19, 2017) (to be 
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1040).  
 45. Id. 
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against the provider . . . [a]ny submission to a court that relies on a pre-
dispute arbitration agreement in support of [an] attempt to seek dismissal, 
deferral, or stay . . . and [t]he pre-dispute arbitration agreement [itself].”46 
The final rule also provided for the CFPB’s posting of the redacted records 
(with possible additional redactions by the CFPB) on a publicly available 
website that the CFPB would establish and maintain, with easy access and 
retrieval functions.  
Opponents quickly mounted legal
47
 and legislative
48
 challenges. Before 
the end of July 2017, the House of Representatives voted to nullify the 
CFPB’s new rule.49 On October 24, with a tie-breaking vote cast by Vice 
President Pence, the U.S. Senate joined the House.
50
 On November 1, 
President Trump signed the repeal of the CFPB’s rule.51 
A surprisingly broad swath of the media covered the Senate’s and the 
President’s action nullifying the CFPB’s final rule.52 As before, though, 
almost no attention was paid to the reporting provisions in the rule. Few 
                                                                                                                 
 46. Id. at 33,430. 
 47. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, U.S. Chamber of Commerce v. 
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, No. 3:17-cv-02670-D (N.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2017). 
 48. See Lisa Lambert, House Votes to Kill Consumer Lawsuit Rule, REUTERS (July 25, 
2017, 5:12 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-congress-arbitration/house-votes-to-
kill-consumer-lawsuit-rule-idUSKBN1AA2SI. 
 49. Id. 
 50. See Gillian B. White, Congress’s Late-Night Vote to Protect Banks from Lawsuits, 
ATLANTIC (Oct. 25, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/10/cfpb-
mandatory-arbitration/543918/ (noting opposition to the CFPB rule from the Treasury 
Department “headed by the former Goldman Sachs banker Steve Mnuchin” and the “Office 
of the Comptroller of the Currency, currently led by the one-time Wells Fargo defense 
attorney Keith Noreika”). 
 51. See Sylvan Lane, Trump Repeals Consumer Arbitration Rule, Wins Banker Praise, 
HILL (Nov. 1, 2017, 4:43 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/finance/358297-trump-repeals-
consumer-bureau-arbitration-rule-joined-by-heads-of-banking. 
 52. See, e.g., Chris Arnold, Senate Kills Rule on Class-Action Lawsuits Against 
Financial Firms, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Oct. 25, 2017, 4:43 PM ET), https://www.npr.org/ 
2017/10/25/560089065/senate-kills-rule-on-class-action-lawsuits-against-financial-firms; 
Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Consumer Bureau Loses Fight to Allow More Class-Action Suits, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/24/business/senate-vote-
wall-street-regulation.html; Megan Leonhardt, Lawmakers Just Made It Nearly Impossible 
for You to Sue Companies Like Equifax and Wells Fargo, MONEY (Oct. 25, 2017), 
http://time.com/money/4996613/senate-kills-cfpb-arbitration-rules/; Jim Spencer, Class-
Action Rule’s Defeat Came Despite Widespread Appeal, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB. (Oct. 28, 
2017, 12:28 AM), http://www.startribune.com/class-action-rule-s-defeat-came-despite-
widespread-appeal/453692293/. 
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noticed when the CFPB first proposed to require reporting. Few noticed 
when the CFPB announced its reporting requirements. Few noticed when 
the reporting requirements were repealed. Regardless, by the end of this 
saga, the opportunity to bring some measure of transparency to mandatory 
pre-dispute consumer arbitration was dead. 
Why, at this point, should anyone care? 
II. The Experience of Federal and State Courts with the Collection and 
Publication of Information Regarding Civil Litigation 
Professor Judith Resnik has observed recently that judges regularly 
“posit that openness supports informed discussions of government, fosters 
perceptions of fairness, checks corruption, enhances performance, 
facilitates accountability, discourages fraud, and permits communities to 
vent emotions.”53 Perhaps the courts’ appreciation of the benefits of 
openness, particularly in a democracy, helps to explain federal and state 
courts’ general history of ensuring access to information regarding their 
operations.
54
 
Of course, court filings have long been presumed to be accessible to the 
public. As a result, information regarding the claims in individual cases, 
relief sought, counterclaims, defenses, parties, lawyers, and court 
judgments have been available to those willing to undertake the effort and 
time required to travel to individual courthouses and page through court 
files.
55
 Access to federal filings became much easier in 1990 with the 
creation of PACER (Public Access to Court Electronic Records), an online 
system maintained by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.
56
 
Access is not free, however,
57
 which has placed limits on the availability of 
                                                                                                                 
 53. Resnik, The Contingency of Openness, supra note 2, at 1671-72. 
 54. See id. at 1636 (“Judges gain legitimacy from being embedded in public 
exchanges.”); Dru Stevenson & Nicholas J. Wagoner, Bargaining in the Shadow of Big 
Data, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1337, 1355-57 (2015) (tracing transparency of the courts back to 
Medieval Europe and Colonial America). 
 55. See David S. Ardia & Anne Klinefelter, Privacy and Court Records: An Empirical 
Study, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1807, 1817-18 (2015); see also Elizabeth Figueroa, 
Transparency in Administrative Courts: From the Outside Looking In, 35 J. NAT’L ASS’N 
ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 1, 36-37 (2015) (regarding administrative courts). 
 56. See Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 54, at 1357-59. 
 57. The cost is ten cents per page, with a thirty-page cap on such costs for documents 
and case-specific reports. This cap does not apply to other searches. See Frequently Asked 
Questions, PACER, https://www.pacer.gov/psc/faq.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2018); see 
also Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 54, at 1359-62 (regarding complaints about pay wall, 
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this resource for empirical research.
58
 In addition, as Peter Rutledge has 
observed, “the litigation system is not always bathed in sunshine—
protective orders, closed proceedings, filings under seal, and settlements all 
reduce the degree of public scrutiny of the system.”59  
Both federal and state courts make aggregate information available 
regarding their operations. Interestingly, the Attorney General of the United 
States was responsible for the first publication of statistical tables regarding 
the federal courts in 1871.
60
 Today, the Administrative Office of the U.S. 
Courts produces and publishes annual reports that discuss the federal courts 
generally, with separate sections devoted to component parts of the federal 
judiciary. The reports provide aggregate numbers regarding complaints 
against judges and their disposition.
61
 They also highlight and explain 
unusual increases or declines in civil filings or dispositions.
62
 These 
                                                                                                                 
free-access pilot program, subsequent hacking of PACER, and creation of web application, 
RECAP, which saves duplicates of downloaded documents). Recently, Congressman Greg 
Collins introduced the Electronic Court Records Reform Act (H.R. 6714, 115th Cong. 
(2018)), which would require documents downloaded from the PACER database to be free. 
See Jason Tashea, Proposed Legislation Would Eliminate PACER Fees, ABA J. (Sept. 18, 
2018, 10:55 AM CDT), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/new_bill_wants_to_end_ 
pacer_fees. 
 58. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Court-System Transparency, 94 IOWA L. REV. 481, 537 
(2009) (urging that federal courts should require the use of data-enabled PDF forms) 
(“Policymakers, litigants, and the public could see the amounts of damages granted in 
personal-injury cases, the lengths of criminal sentences, the likelihood of success on various 
kinds of motions, the differences in outcomes among courts, the relative effectiveness of 
lawyers and expert witnesses, and the answers to a myriad of other questions.”); see also 
Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 54, at 1359-60.  
 59. Rutledge, supra note 38, at 276-77 (urging that “the virtues of confidentiality at 
least counterbalance some of the loss of transparency”); see also Michael Kagan, Rebecca 
Gill & Fatma Marouf, Invisible Adjudication in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 106 GEO. L.J. 
683, 685-86 (2018) (reporting results of empirical research showing that many federal circuit 
court decisions on immigration appeals are unavailable and essentially invisible to the 
public). 
 60. See Resnik, A2J, supra note 2, at 627 (citing PETER G. FISH, THE POLITICS OF 
FEDERAL JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 91-95 (1973); David S. Clark, Adjudication to 
Administration: A Statistical Analysis of Federal District Courts in the Twentieth Century, 
55 S. CAL. L. REV. 65, 97 (1981)). 
 61. See, e.g., Judicial Business 2016, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-
reports/judicial-business-2016 (last visited Nov. 27, 2018). 
 62. See, e.g., U.S. District Courts—Judicial Business 2017, U.S. CTS., http://www. 
uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/us-district-courts-judicial-business-2017 (last visited Nov. 27, 
2018) (explaining significant increases or drops in case numbers, and regional variations, 
due to claims arising out of foreclosures, purchases of genetically modified corn seeds from 
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explanations alert interested parties to trends throughout the federal courts 
or in particular jurisdictions. Twice each year, the Administrative Office of 
the U.S. Courts also publishes the most frequently requested tables of 
statistics regarding the workload of the federal courts. These tables contain 
aggregate data regarding a variety of information: numbers of cases filed, 
terminated, and pending by jurisdiction; numbers of cases filed by 
jurisdiction, nature of suit, and district; numbers of cases terminated, by 
nature of suit and action taken; and median time from filing to disposition 
of civil cases, by action taken.
63
 Both the annual reports and the semi-
annual tables of statistics are available online at no cost.  
These reports and statistical tables are not perfect. Concerns have been 
raised regarding the accuracy and consistency of the data input by court 
clerks.
64
 In addition, there are some notable exclusions in the data captured 
for aggregation and publication. For example, while the reports and tables 
reveal the occurrence of dispositions, they do not provide information 
regarding the terms of such dispositions. Further, while the reports and 
tables show the number of civil cases terminated during a twelve-month 
period and provide some breakdowns regarding the actions taken that 
resulted in termination,
65
 such breakdowns are extremely limited. For 
example, there is no information regarding the number of terminations 
resulting from judicial settlement conferences, mediation, other facilitated 
settlement procedures, or traditional bilateral negotiations between the 
lawyers.
66
 Notably, a few district courts have taken the initiative to provide 
                                                                                                                 
Syngenta AG, Deepwater Horizon’s oil spill, and use of pelvic repair products, the 
cholesterol drug Lipitor, and Skechers Toning Shoe Products). 
 63. See Statistical Tables for the Federal Judiciary—June 2016, U.S. CTS., 
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/statistical-tables-federal-judiciary-june-2016 (last 
visited Nov. 27, 2018). 
 64. See, e.g., Gillian K. Hadfield, Judging Science: An Essay on the Unscientific Basis 
of Beliefs About the Impact of Legal Rules on Science and the Need for Better Data About 
Law, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 137, 156 (2006); Gillian K. Hadfield, Where Have All the Trials 
Gone? Settlements, Nontrial Adjudications, and Statistical Artifacts in the Changing 
Disposition of Federal Civil Cases, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 705, 722 (2004). 
 65. The tables indicate how many civil cases are terminated with no court action and 
with court action occurring before trial, during or after pretrial, during or after a non-jury 
trial, and during or after a jury trial. See, e.g., Table C-4—U.S. District Courts—Civil 
Statistical Tables for the Federal Judiciary, U.S. CTS. (Dec. 31, 2017), http://www.uscourts. 
gov/statistics/table/c-4/statistical-tables-federal-judiciary/2017/12/31. 
 66. Nancy A. Welsh, Magistrate Judges, Settlement and Procedural Justice, 16 NEV. 
L.J. 983, 1044-45 (2016) (“While much is reported about magistrate judges’ functions, much 
more is unknown—e.g., how many dispositions actually result from magistrate judges’ 
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aggregated information regarding their use of mediation and other ADR 
procedures.
67
 Other district courts have developed their own jurisdiction-
specific settlement databases. Federal magistrate judges facilitating 
settlement conferences then use these databases with parties to allow 
comparisons with settlements reached in similar matters.
68
 These databases 
are not made available to the public generally. 
State courts also publish aggregate information regarding their 
operations. For civil caseloads, state courts tend to report the number of 
filings and dispositions, often indicating whether the dispositions were the 
result of defaults, jury trials, or bench trials.
69
 However, only a few state 
                                                                                                                 
settlement sessions, how many cases go to mediation, how often magistrate judges serve as 
mediators, how many dispositions result from mediation and other settlement procedures, 
and the terms of these dispositions.”). 
 67. See, e.g., REBECCA PRICE, U.S. DIST. COURT S. DIST. OF N.Y., MEDIATION PROGRAM: 
ANNUAL REPORT JANUARY 1, 2016 – DECEMBER 31, 2016 (Dec. 5, 2017); U.S. DIST. COURT 
OF THE N. DIST. OF CAL., ADR PROGRAM REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 2017 (OCTOBER 1, 2016 
THROUGH SEPTEMBER 30, 2017); U.S. DIST. COURT OF THE CENT. DIST. OF CAL., ADR 
PROGRAM REPORT – CALENDAR YEAR 2016; see also Wayne Brazil, Informalism and 
Formalism in the History of ADR in the United States and An Exploration of the Sources, 
Character, and Implications of Formalism in a Court-sponsored ADR Programme, in 
FORMALISATION AND FLEXIBILISATION IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION 250, 303-04, 317, 330-332 
(Joachim Zekoll et al. eds., 2014) (using data gathered by District Court staff to discuss party 
perceptions of mediator interventions and fairness, as well as parties’ or their attorneys’ 
preference for mediation). 
 68. See Morton Denlow, Magistrate Judges’ Important Role in Settling Cases, 61 FED. 
LAW. 103, 103 (2014); John Lande, How Much Justice Can We Afford?: Defining the 
Courts’ Roles and Deciding the Appropriate Number of Trials, Settlement Signals, and 
Other Elements Needed to Administer Justice, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 213, 235–36 (citing 
Morton Denlow & Jennifer E. Shack, Judicial Settlement Databases: Development and 
Uses, JUDGES’ J., Winter 2004, at 19, 19-21 (writing about settlement databases)). 
 69. See, e.g., MD. CTS., MARYLAND JUDICIARY STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 2017 (2018), 
https://www.courts.state.md.us/sites/default/files/import/publications/annualreport/reports/20
17/fy2017statisticalabstract.pdf (providing number of civil cases filed and terminated; no 
detail regarding the manner of disposition); Summary Reporting System, FLA. CTS., 
http://trialstats.flcourts.org/TrialCourtStats/ReportTrialCourtStats (last visited Oct. 25, 2018) 
(showing that Circuit Civil cases’ disposition types include: dismissed before hearing; 
dismissed after hearing; disposed by default; disposed by judge; disposed by non-jury trial; 
disposed by jury trial; and other); OFFICE OF COURT ADMIN., TEX. JUDICIAL BRANCH, 
ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT FOR THE TEXAS JUDICIARY: FISCAL YEAR 2017, at 22, 23, 46 
(2018), http://www.txcourts.gov/media/1441398/ar-fy-17-final.pdf (providing information 
regarding filings and dispositions for civil cases as a result of: dismissal by plaintiff, default 
judgment, agreed judgment, bench trial, dismissal for want of prosecution, all other 
dispositions, summary judgment, jury/directed verdict); JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., CAL. 
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courts provide more detailed aggregate numbers regarding the dispositions 
resulting from the use of dispute resolution processes, such as court-
connected mediation, arbitration, early neutral evaluation, or judicial 
settlement conferences.
70
  
Significantly, federal and state courts are not alone in providing access to 
filings and aggregate information. Increasingly, quasi-public and “private” 
dispute resolution procedures are also subject to some degree of 
transparency. 
III. The Experience of Quasi-Public and Private Organizations, States, and 
Users with the Collection and Publication of Information Regarding 
Dispute Resolution 
The experience of quasi-public arbitration programs, private dispute 
resolution organizations, states and users with the collection and publication 
of data regarding arbitration proceedings (and to a much lesser degree, 
mediation sessions) is also instructive. The transparency and accountability 
offered by such reporting and publication have helped to promote the 
integrity of the dispute resolution processes.  
A few examples follow regarding quasi-public and private arbitration 
programs’ provision for the transparency and accountability of their 
processes and outcomes by making their awards available and searchable 
online, much as proposed by the CFPB and supported by the Section. These 
are followed by examples of states’ disclosure requirements, users’ “self-
help” initiatives, and calls for ODR to provide for transparency. 
                                                                                                                 
COURTS, 2017 COURT STATISTICS REPORT: STATEWIDE CASELOAD TRENDS: 2006–2007 
THROUGH 2015–2016, at 95-98 (2017), http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/2017-Court-
Statistics-Report.pdf (listing dispositions for delay of prosecution, through other means, after 
a jury trial or after a bench trial). 
 70. See, e.g., Uniform Data Reporting, Alternative Dispute Resolution Programs: Cases 
Ordered July through September 2017, FLA. CTS. (Oct. 27, 2017), http://www.flcourts.org/ 
core/fileparse.php/541/urlt/Alternative-Dispute-Resolution-Program-Jul-Sep17.pdf (“This 
data is reported by court administration through the Uniform Data Reporting system web 
application and is not audited. In addition, data may be amended at a later date.”). But see 
Resnik, The Contingency of Openness, supra note 2, at 1667-68 (reporting that in Illinois, 
court-connected arbitration includes a public dimension and that outcomes are in a court 
database). 
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A. FINRA: Required Publication of Awards and Other Aggregate Data
71
 
The rules of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”), a 
not-for-profit organization authorized by Congress, require its awards to be 
made publicly available.
72
 The awards are online and searchable through 
the FINRA Arbitration Awards Online database,
73
 as well as commercial 
databases, such as Westlaw. The FINRA database is available without 
charge, and users can access FINRA arbitration awards from January 1989 
through the present. In addition, users can access the awards of all 
arbitration programs absorbed over the years by FINRA (which include the 
American Stock Exchange, Chicago Board Options Exchange, International 
Stock Exchange, Philadelphia Stock Exchange, and Municipal Securities 
Rulemaking Board) and the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) (which 
includes Pacific Exchange/NYSE ARCA).  
The database provides users with instantaneous access to awards and the 
ability to search for awards by using multiple criteria, such as by case 
number, keywords within awards, arbitrator names, party names, date 
ranges set by the user, and any combination of these features. FINRA also 
now includes information about the panel selection method and panel 
composition.  
In addition, FINRA publishes various statistics online:
 
 
! The number of cases filed and closed thus far during the current 
year 
! Historical statistics for cases filed and closed 
! The top fifteen controversy types in customer arbitrations 
! The top fifteen security types in customer arbitrations 
! The top fifteen controversy types in intra-industry arbitrations 
                                                                                                                 
 71. See Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority’s 
Dispute Resolution Activities 21 (rev. Apr. 16, 2018) (part of 2018 FINRA Annual 
Conference materials).  
 72. See FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., FINRA MANUAL r. 12904(h) (2018), 
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=4192 
[hereinafter FINRA MANUAL] (“All awards shall be made publicly available.”); Arbitration 
Process: Decision and Award, FINRA, https://www.finra.org/arbitration-and-
mediation/decision-award (last visited Dec. 7, 2018) (“FINRA makes all arbitration awards 
publicly available for free by posting them on Arbitration Awards Online.”). 
 73. See FINRA Arbitration Awards Online, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/arbitration-
and-mediation/arbitration-awards (last visited Dec. 7, 2018).  
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! How arbitration cases close (e.g., after arbitration hearing, after 
arbitrators’ review of documents, direct settlement by parties, 
settled via mediation,
74
 withdrawn, all others) 
! Results of customer claimant arbitration award cases (e.g., 
percentage of all customer claimant cases closed that were 
decided by arbitrators, percentage (and number) of cases where 
customer awarded damages)  
! Results of all-public panels and majority-public panels in 
customer cases 
! Arbitrators by type and location 
! Mediation statistics thus far during the current year.75 
The resulting disclosures have helped to protect the integrity of the 
arbitration process by providing parties with information they need to 
prepare for arbitrations and, more broadly, enabling important empirical 
research and systemic analysis that otherwise would not be possible.
76
 
These disclosures also have permitted regulators and observers to become 
aware of potentially worrisome trends in the financial services industry. 
FINRA has continued to examine its procedures to enhance their 
transparency and legitimacy. Since 2009, for example, FINRA has required 
its arbitrators to issue an explained award—defined as “a fact-based award 
stating the general reason(s) for the arbitrators’ decision”—if all parties to 
the dispute jointly request one.
77
 Few parties have jointly requested an 
explained award since the rule’s enactment. In response, the FINRA 
Dispute Resolution Task Force recommended that FINRA change its rule to 
require an explained decision unless any party notifies the panel before the 
initial pre-hearing conference that it is opting out of such requirement.
78
 
                                                                                                                 
 74. FINRA also offers mediation. See Mediation Overview, FINRA, https://www.finra. 
org/arbitration-and-mediation/mediation-overview (last visited Dec. 7, 2018). 
 75. See Dispute Resolution Statistics, FINRA, https://www.finra.org/arbitration-and-
mediation/dispute-resolution-statistics (last visited Dec. 7, 2018). 
 76. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & Theodore Eisenberg, Punitive Damages in Securities 
Arbitration: An Empirical Study, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 497 (2010). 
 77. See FINRA MANUAL, supra note 72, at r. 12904(g)(2), http://finra.complinet.com/ 
en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&element_id=4192. 
 78. See FINRA DISPUTE RESOLUTION TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 20-23 (2015), https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/Final-DR-task-
force-report.pdf. 
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The Task Force noted that it believed “increased confidence in the fairness 
of the system would likely flow from th[e] increased transparency.”79 
B. ICANN: Required Publication of Awards 
The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (“ICANN”), 
a not-for-profit public benefit corporation, similarly requires its approved 
dispute resolution service providers to make Uniform Domain-Name 
Dispute-Resolution Policy (“UDRP”) decisions publicly available online,80 
thus providing the public, parties, and arbitrators with easy access to 
arbitrators’ decisions and their reasoning.81 Publication of neutrals’ 
decisions is understood as necessary to enhance the legitimacy and 
predictability
82
 of the system. One of the dominant providers, the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), has also established a system 
for querying its database regarding particular issues or categories of cases.
83
 
As a result of the required publication of decisions, the ICANN system has 
permitted patterns of decision-making and institutions’ repeat appointments 
of arbitrators to be highlighted. Such transparency has assisted the integrity 
of the dispute resolution system.
84
  
                                                                                                                 
 79. Id. at 21. 
 80. See Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Rules”), 
ICANN r. 16(b)), https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/udrp-rules-2015-03-11-en (last 
visited on Dec. 11, 2018) (“Except if the Panel determines otherwise [per Paragraph 4(j) of 
the Policy, ‘when an Administrative Panel determines in an exceptional case to redact 
portions of its decision’], the Provider shall publish the full decision and the date of its 
implementation on a publicly accessible web site. In any event, the portion of any decision 
determining a complaint to have been brought in bad faith (see Paragraph 15(e) of these 
Rules) shall be published.”). 
 81. See List of Approved Dispute Resolution Service Providers, ICANN, 
https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/providers-6d-2012-02-25-en (last visited Nov. 28, 
2018) (listing approved dispute resolution service providers, including links to their 
databases of proceedings and decisions). 
 82. See World Intellectual Prop. Org., FINAL REPORT OF THE WIPO INTERNET DOMAIN 
NAME PROCESS ¶ 219 (1999). 
 83. See Ethan Katsh & Colin Rule, What We Know and Need to Know About Online 
Dispute Resolution, 67 S.C. L. REV. 329, 336-37 (2016) (noting that the other major 
provider, National Arbitration Forum, enables only a full-text search of its decisions, and it 
is necessary to access a third party in order to conduct a full-text search of the decisions of 
both WIPO and NAM). 
 84. See Benjamin G. Davis, The New New Thing: Uniform Domain Name Dispute 
Resolution Policy of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, 3 J. World 
Intell. Prop. 525, 532 (2000) (updated version); Benjamin G. Davis, The New New Thing: 
Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy of the Internet Corporation for Assigned 
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C. International Arbitration: Required and Increased Voluntary 
Publication of Awards 
International dispute resolution providers regularly make information 
public regarding their proceedings and awards. The World Trade 
Organization (“WTO”), for example, provides a searchable, online database 
of trade disputes brought to the WTO for resolution pursuant to the Dispute 
Settlement Understanding.
85
 The awards are public, while pleadings are 
public only at the election of nations.
86
 In the investor-state arbitration 
                                                                                                                 
Names and Numbers, 17 J. INT’L ARB., no. 3, 2000, at 115, 115-17, 122; Uniform Domain 
Name Dispute Resolution Policy, ICANN, https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/policy-
2012-02-25-en (last visited Nov. 28, 2018); Benjamin G. Davis, Une Magouille Planetaire: 
The UDRP Is an International Scam: An Independent Assessment of the Uniform Domain 
Name Dispute Resolution Policy of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and 
Numbers, 72 MISS. L.J. 815 (2002); Daniel Klerman & Greg Reilly, Forum Selling, 89 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 241, 298 (2016) (reporting that “[a]nalysis of arbitrator selection showed that 
among dominant providers [NAF and WIPO], arbitrators who decided most often in favor of 
the complainant received more cases, while persons with reputations for decisions protective 
of domain name owners were seldom if ever selected as sole arbitrators” and were instead 
“placed on [relatively rarely used] three-person panels”; also observing, based on subsequent 
research, that “the system improved over time”) (citing Michael Geist, Fair.com?: An 
Examination of the Allegations of Systemic Unfairness in the ICANN UDRP, 27 BROOK. J. 
INT’L L. 903, 928-30 (2002); 2012 Domain Dispute Study, DNATTORNEY.COM (Aug. 28, 
2012), https://dnattorney.com/resources/case-studies/); Domain Name Dispute Resolution 
Policies, ICANN, https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/dndr-2012-02-25-en (last visited 
Nov. 28, 2018) (providing other domain name dispute resolution policies). Recently, Amy 
Schmitz and Colin Rule have pointed out the importance of ICANN’s transparency: 
Transparency helps to ensure that an ODR system is operating the way that it 
should. ICANN's Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Protocol (UDRP) 
is an excellent example of a transparent online dispute resolution process (even 
though it may have challenges in some of the other ethical standards). Under 
the UDRP, every case filing and decision is publicly accessible. This has led to 
quite a bit of external scrutiny for the UDRP process. As one may expect, it is 
not necessarily comfortable for the participants and the dispute resolution 
service providers to have full public scrutiny for all cases coming through the 
system. However, transparency can be a very important way for ODR systems 
to retain public trust, and for problems to be detected quickly and resolved. 
Much like how sunlight laws in the public sector promote honesty, process 
transparency in ODR is key to combating systemic bias. 
AMY SCHMITZ & COLIN RULE, THE NEW HANDSHAKE: ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND THE 
FUTURE OF CONSUMER PROTECTION 76 (2017). 
 85. See Dispute Settlement Archive, World Trade Org., https://www.wto.org/english/ 
tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_e.htm#disputes (last visited Nov. 28, 2018). 
 86. For example, the United States makes its pleadings available. Id. 
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context, the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(“ICSID”) currently offers an online, searchable list of cases and arbitral 
awards.
87
 ICSID only publishes awards with the consent of the parties. 
However, even without the parties’ consent, ICSID publishes excerpts of 
arbitral panels’ legal reasoning.88 This information has been useful for the 
parties directly involved in investor-state disputes and for those conducting 
systemic, empirical analysis.
89
  
Indeed, in the investor-state context, substantial attention has been paid 
to the need for transparency. For example, the United Nations Rules on 
Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration, which became 
effective on April 1, 2014, provide for the publication of documents, open 
hearings, and the opportunity for interested third parties to file and make 
submissions.
90
 For disputes arising out of treaties concluded before April 1, 
2014, these rules regarding transparency apply only at the election of the 
parties to the arbitration or the parties to the relevant treaty.
91
 
                                                                                                                 
 87. See ICSID Award Database, World Bank, https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/ 
cases/AdvancedSearch.aspx. (last visited Nov. 28, 2018). 
 88. See INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, ICSID CONVENTION, 
REGULATIONS AND RULES Arbitration Rule 48(4), at 122 (Apr. 2006), https://icsid. 
worldbank.org/en/documents/icsiddocs/icsid%20convention%20english.pdf (“The Centre 
shall not publish the award without the consent of the parties. The Centre shall, however, 
promptly include in its publications excerpts of the legal reasoning of the Tribunal.”).  
 89. See, e.g., Daniel Behn, Legitimacy, Evolution, and Growth in Investment Treaty 
Arbitration: Empirically Evaluating the State-of-the-Art, 46 GEO. J. INT’L. L. 363 (2015); 
Susan D. Franck, Empirically Evaluating Claims About Investment Treaty Arbitration, 86 
N.C. L. REV. 1 (2007); Susan D. Franck & Lindsey E. Wylie, Predicting Outcomes in 
Investment Treaty Arbitration, 65 DUKE L.J. 459 (2015). 
 90. UNITED NATIONS COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE L., UNCITRAL RULES ON 
TRANSPARENCY IN TREATY-BASED INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION art. 3, 4 (2014), http:// 
www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/2014Transparency.html; see also 
Deborah R. Hensler, The Private in Public, the Public in Private: The Blurring Boundary 
Between Public and Private Dispute Resolution, in FORMALISATION AND FLEXIBILISATION IN 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 67, at 45, 63-65 (discussing the controversy over 
transparency). 
 91. See generally U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE L., UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON 
TRANSPARENCY IN TREATY-BASED INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION [THE “MAURITIUS 
CONVENTION ON TRANSPARENCY”] (2014), https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/ 
arbitration/transparency-convention/Transparency-Convention-e.pdf. See also James Hope, 
Transparency in International Arbitration, CDR: COM. DISP. RESOL. (May 11, 2016), 
https://www.cdr-news.com/categories/expert-views/6376-transparency-in-international-
arbitration (describing the application of the United Nations Commission on International 
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Even though international commercial arbitration awards are not 
required to be published, there are indications that such awards and 
aggregated information are being published voluntarily with greater 
frequency. In the past, only a selective group of lawyers and law firms was 
likely to know about and use international commercial arbitrators’ 
decisions. Now, however, international commercial arbitral institutions are 
advocating increased publication, “with some institutions even shifting to a 
presumption in favor of redacted awards in the absence of party 
objection.”92 Legal journals, such as the Collection of ICC Arbitral Awards, 
publish arbitral awards with the redaction of names and other identifying 
information.
93
 As a result of shifting presumptions regarding the publication 
of awards, some commentators perceive an increasingly transparent body of 
non-binding but persuasive precedent being produced by international 
commercial arbitration.
94
 Other commentators acknowledge a trend toward 
transparency (especially in the investor-state arbitration context as 
described above), but they also note that “most if not all” international 
commercial arbitral institutions continue to publish only selected awards 
and then only in redacted form, and that such awards “are not always easy 
to search or find.”95 Indeed, access to such awards is generally available 
only by subscription.  
Meanwhile, online subscription services now exist that use aggregated 
data regarding international commercial mediation and arbitration 
contributed by dispute resolution organizations from around the world (and 
involving data from 185 nations) to generate up-to-date geographic and 
case-type reports on “average claim amounts by case type, average claim 
amount versus amount awarded, arbitration and/or settlement outcomes by 
                                                                                                                 
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Rules on Transparency, Mauritius Convention on Transparency, 
and the UNCITRAL Transparency Registry). 
 92. Catherine A. Rogers, Transparency in International Commercial Arbitration, 54 
Univ. Kan. L. Rev. 1301, 1319-20 (2006); see also Cases, PERMANENT CT. OF ARB., 
https://pca-cpa.org/en/cases/ (last visited Nov. 28, 2018) (providing public information 
regarding cases at parties’ election). 
 93. See Christian Duve & Jill I. Gross, Commercial Arbitration: Germany and the 
United States, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 2017, at 15, 18 (citing Berger, SchiedsVZ 2009, 289, 
296). 
 94. See Rogers, supra note 92, at 1319-20. 
 95. Ank Santens & Romain Zamour, Dreaded Dearth of Precedent in the Wake of 
International Arbitration: Could the Cause Also Bring the Cure?, 7 Y.B. ON ARB. & 
MEDIATION 73, 78 (2015) (citing S.I. Strong, Research in International Commercial 
Arbitration: Special Skills, Special Sources, 20 AM. REV. OF ARB. 119 (2009)). 
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case type, whether parties frequently file counterclaims and their success 
rates, and the average length of case.”96 Subscribers also can learn about 
“the frequency of the use of discovery tools, including e-discovery, and the 
success rate of counterclaims by case type.”97 Access to these aggregated 
data regarding international commercial arbitration and mediation requires 
payment of a fee.  
D. Labor Arbitration: Required and Voluntary Publication of Awards 
Labor arbitration provides another model for the publication of 
information regarding arbitrations and their results.
98
 Many state providers 
of labor arbitration make their awards available online.
99
 Some states also 
make public the results of grievance arbitrations with public sector 
unions.
100
 
                                                                                                                 
 96. Q&A with Bill Slate, Chairman, CEO and Co-founder of Dispute Resolution Data, 
NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT (Oct. 2017), http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/ 
publications/157150/data-insights; see also International Commercial Arbitration and 
Mediation: What Does the Data Show?, DISP. RESOL. DATA, 
http://www.disputeresolutiondata.com/international_commercial_arbitration (last visited 
Dec. 11, 2018) [hereinafter What Does the Data Show?] (“[D]ispute Resolution 
Data (DRD) is receiving data from 17 international entities and then aggregating the data by 
case type (28 different) and seven geographic regions. In this process, each closed 
international commercial arbitration provides information for up to 100 data fields and each 
closed international mediation up to 45 data fields. Presently, over 1,000 cases have 
provided information, in excess of, 40,000 data fields.”). 
 97. What Does the Data Show?, supra note 96. 
 98. In contrast, this sort of information is not generally available for employment 
arbitration. See David B. Lipsky, J. Ryan Lamare & Michael D. Maffie, Mandatory 
Employment Arbitration: Dispelling the Myths, 32 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 133, 
142 (2014) (critiquing claims regarding expansive use of mandatory pre-dispute employment 
arbitration clauses but also acknowledging “that no institution or individual has ever been 
able to collect a comprehensive set of data on the total number of employment arbitration 
claims”). But see text at infra notes 103-04 (regarding AAA disclosures, including 
disclosures regarding employment arbitration conducted pursuant to mandatory pre-dispute 
arbitration clauses). 
 99. See, e.g., Arbitration Awards, St. of Minn. Bureau of Mediation Serv., 
http://mn.gov/admin/bms/arbitration/awards/; (last visited Nov. 28, 2018); Interest 
Arbitration Awards, WASH. ST. PUB. EMP. RELATIONS COMM’N, https://decisions.perc.wa. 
gov/waperc/interest-arbritations/en/nav_date.do (last visited Nov. 28, 2018).  
 100. See, e.g., Grievance Arbitration Decisions, WASH. OFF. OF FIN. MGMT., 
http://www.ofm.wa.gov/labor/arbitration/grievance/decisions.asp (last visited Nov. 28, 
2018).  
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In other settings, labor arbitration awards are not required to be 
published. However, those that are published are generally accompanied by 
reasoned opinions that provide parties with valuable information.
101
 Parties 
can access searchable online databases of these labor arbitration awards 
through various private providers (e.g., Bloomberg BNA, CCH, and 
Thomson West’s LAIS). Bloomberg BNA’s Arbitration Award Navigator, 
for example, allows users to access a collection of at least 20,000 arbitration 
awards to assess trends, evaluate arbitrators, and pinpoint awards. Users can 
search awards by case name, arbitrator, topic, union, employer, industry, 
classification outline number, and several other criteria. These sources are 
non-public and require payment. 
E. Consumer Arbitration in California, District of Columbia, Maine, and 
Maryland: Required Disclosures 
There is also substantial state (and District of Columbia) experience with 
the required submission and publication of data, specifically regarding 
consumer arbitration. Again, such disclosures have enabled vital empirical 
research and systemic analysis.
102
  
                                                                                                                 
 101. The benefits of arbitrator opinion writing are many and varied. See Sarah R. Cole, 
The Federalization of Consumer Arbitration: Possible Solutions, 2013 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 271, 
280. First, opinion writing improves the quality of arbitral decision-making. The process of 
writing an opinion encourages the arbitrator to carefully consider her decision. In addition, 
opinion writing assists parties in selecting an arbitrator because it provides them with better 
information about a particular arbitrator's decision-making process and potential biases. The 
opinion-writing requirement also improves the hearing process (because the arbitrator will 
need to make sure he or she understands all of the issues presented) and provides a greater 
sense of resolution to the parties, who will now have a deeper understanding of the reasons 
they won or lost. Moreover, this relatively inexpensive process change would have a 
significant impact on parties' and the public's perception of arbitration as a fair and 
legitimate forum for the resolution of disputes. See generally Chad M. Oldfather, Writing, 
Cognition, and the Nature of the Judicial Functions, 96 GEO. L.J. 1283 (2008). 
 102. See, e.g., Alexander J.S. Colvin, Empirical Research on Employment Arbitration: 
Clarity Amidst the Sound and Fury?, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 405, 407 (2007). The 
AAA has been most conscientious in complying with California’s disclosure requirements. 
Access to the AAA data first indicated both the presence of a “repeat player” effect in 
employment arbitration and the improvement in employees’ success rates after the AAA 
began enforcing the Employment Due Process Protocol. See Lisa B. Bingham & Shimon 
Sarraf, Employment Arbitration Before and After the Due Process Protocol for Mediation 
and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising Out of Employment: Preliminary Evidence 
that Self-Regulation Makes a Difference, in ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE 
EMPLOYMENT ARENA 303, 303 (Samuel Estreicher & David Sherwyn eds., 2004). 
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Unlike the quasi-public and private organizations described supra, the 
states have not provided for the disclosure and publication of awards. 
Instead, they have required dispute resolution providers to collect and 
disclose specific pieces of information. In some respects, the resulting data 
provides less information than would be available from a review of 
arbitration filings and awards; in other respects, the resulting data exceeds 
what would be available from such a review. 
California is the leader in requiring disclosures regarding consumer 
arbitration. Effective January 1, 2003, California Civil Procedure Code 
section 1281.96 began requiring dispute resolution providers to collect, 
publish at least quarterly,
103
 and make available to the public on the 
provider’s website (and on paper upon request) a report containing 
information about the provider’s consumer arbitrations within the preceding 
five years.
104
 The statute also requires the report’s format to be searchable 
and sortable by members of the public using “readily available software” 
and “to be directly accessible from a conspicuously displayed link” that is 
identified as “consumer case information.”105  
The statute, which was amended in 2014, currently requires publication 
of the following pieces of information:  
 (1) Whether arbitration was demanded pursuant to a pre-
dispute arbitration clause and, if so, whether the pre-dispute 
arbitration clause designated the administering private arbitration 
company. 
 (2) The name of the nonconsumer party, if the nonconsumer 
party is a corporation or other business entity, and whether the 
nonconsumer party was the initiating party or the responding 
party, if known. 
                                                                                                                 
 103. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.96(a) (West 2016). Certain providers that handle 
fewer than 50 consumer arbitrations are required to report only semiannually. Id. § 
1281.96(c)(2). 
 104. Id. § 1281.96(a). See generally Jay Folberg, Arbitration Ethics—Is California the 
Future?, 18 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 343, 347 (2003); Ruth V. Glick, California Arbitration 
Reform: The Aftermath, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 119, 122 (2003); Richard Chernick, Imposed-
Arbitration Reforms Threaten to Stifle Strengths of Commercial Arbitration, DISP. RESOL. 
MAG., Fall 2002, at 16; Jay Folberg, Arbitration Ethics: Winds of Reform Blowing from the 
West?, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 2002, at 5 (describing reasons underlying establishment of 
new disclosure requirements for arbitrators in California); Gail Hillebrand, Should 
California’s Ethics Rules Be Adopted Nationwide?, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 2002, at 10. 
 105.  CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.96(b) (West 2016). 
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 (3) The nature of the dispute involved as one of the following: 
goods; credit; other banking or finance; insurance; health care; 
construction; real estate; telecommunications, including software 
and Internet usage; debt collection; personal injury; 
employment
106
; or other. . . . 
 (4) Whether the consumer or nonconsumer party was the 
prevailing party. As used in this section, “prevailing party” 
includes the party with a net monetary recovery or an award of 
injunctive relief. 
 (5) The total number of occasions, if any, the nonconsumer 
party has previously been a party in an arbitration administered 
by the private arbitration company. 
 (6) The total number of occasions, if any, the nonconsumer 
party has previously been a party in a mediation administered by 
the private arbitration company. 
 (7) Whether the consumer party was represented by an 
attorney and, if so, the name of the attorney and the full name of 
the law firm that employs the attorney, if any. 
 (8) The date the private arbitration company received the 
demand for arbitration, the date the arbitrator was appointed, and 
the date of disposition by the arbitrator or private arbitration 
company. 
 (9) The type of disposition of the dispute, if known, identified 
as one of the following: withdrawal, abandonment, settlement, 
award after hearing, award without hearing, default, or dismissal 
without hearing. If a case was administered in a hearing, indicate 
whether the hearing was conducted in person, by telephone or 
video conference, or by documents only. 
 (10) The amount of the claim, whether equitable relief was 
requested or awarded, the amount of any monetary award, the 
amount of any attorney's fees awarded, and any other relief 
granted, if any. 
                                                                                                                 
 106. California is unique in including the arbitration of employment matters within a 
statute structured to focus on consumer arbitration. The Section was careful to take no 
position on this inclusion.  
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 (11) The name of the arbitrator, his or her total fee for the 
case, the percentage of the arbitrator's fee allocated to each party, 
whether a waiver of any fees was granted, and, if so, the amount 
of the waiver.
107
 
It is particularly notable that California’s statute requires disclosure of a 
non-consumer’s prior mediation experience with a dispute resolution 
provider, as well as prior arbitration experience.
108
 Meanwhile, the statute 
does not require disclosure of the name of the consumer, the specific legal 
claims involved, the basis for an arbitral award, or the terms of any 
settlement. The statute also does not provide for any mechanism to enforce 
its requirements.
109
  
Some commentators and scholars report that despite the value of the 
information disclosed pursuant to California’s requirements, many dispute 
resolution providers are not in compliance.
110
 The AAA has been 
particularly conscientious in complying with the state’s requirements. The 
AAA displays the relevant data quite prominently on its website, discloses 
information about the statutes that require provision of the data, provides 
guidance on how to search the database,
111
 and, as noted supra, cooperated 
with the CFPB in furnishing data for the study required by the Dodd-Frank 
Act. Recently, however, Professor Judith Resnik reported deficiencies in 
even the AAA’s disclosures112 and concluded that the available information 
                                                                                                                 
 107. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.96(a) (West 2016). 
 108. Id.  
 109. Id. 
 110. See Resnik, A2J, supra note 2, at 648 (observing that a 2017 study reported that of 
the 32 entities offering consumer arbitration, only about one third (eleven) posted the data 
and one tenth (three) met all the California requirements); Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra 
note 6, at 2898 (citing DAVID J. JUNG, JAMIE HOROWITZ, JOSE HERRERA & LEE ROSENBERG, 
PUB. LAW RESEARCH INST., REPORTING CONSUMER ARBITRATION DATA IN CALIFORNIA: AN 
ANALYSIS OF COMPLIANCE WITH CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1281.96, at 9, 51 
(2013)). 
 111. See Practice Areas: AAA Consumer and Employment Arbitration Statistics, AM. 
ARB. ASS’N, https://www.adr.org/Consumer (last visited Nov. 28, 2018). 
 112. Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra note 6, at 2900. A research team analyzed the 
AAA’s disclosures regarding claims that had been filed and closed between July 2009 and 
June 2014 (and thus were governed by the 2003 version of California’s disclosure 
requirements). They found disclosures regarding 7,303 consumer claims, excluding real 
estate and construction, and the disclosures generally revealed  
the names of the business entity and of the arbitrators and lawyers (if 
appearing), as well as whether the claim closed by settlement or award, the 
amounts sought, the fees, and fee allocations between the disputants. Of the 
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was “spotty.”113 It does not appear that any dispute resolution provider has 
suffered any negative consequence as a result of the failure to make the 
disclosures required by California.
114
  
Three other jurisdictions have also enacted arbitration disclosure 
requirements: Maine,
115
 Maryland,
116
 and the District of Columbia.
117
 All 
are patterned after California’s 2003 statute, although they include 
variations.  
The District of Columbia’s reporting requirements, which became 
effective in 2008, look much like those in California.
118
 However, the 
                                                                                                                 
5,224 claims “terminated by an award,” about half included a dollar figure. 
Id. at 2899-900. Resnik also observes, “The information on prevailing parties comes with the 
caveat that arbitrators are the source; the AAA has not ‘reviewed, investigated, or evaluated 
the accuracy or completeness’ of such information.” Id. at 2900; see also Resnik, A2J, supra 
note 2, at 649 (observing that arbitration files are not accessible and often are held by 
individual arbitrators, not the reporting dispute resolution providers, and that the providers 
do not independently verify the individual arbitrators’ reports; also noting that “coding errors 
can occur at both individual and aggregate levels” and providing an example of sixty-two 
cases in which the consumers were coded erroneously as seeking exactly the same amount 
and receiving exactly the same award). 
 113. Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra note 6, at 2898; see also Amsler, supra note 6, at 
42 (noting that California data was incomplete, thus precluding systematic analysis of 
outcomes (citing Lisa Blomgren Bingham, Jean R. Sternlight & John C. Healey, Arbitration 
Data Disclosure in California: What We Have and What We Need (Apr. 15, 2005) 
(unpublished paper presented at the American Bar Association Section of Dispute 
Resolution Conference in Los Angeles))).  
 114. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.96(f) provides: “It is the intent of the Legislature that 
private arbitration companies comply with all legal obligations of this section.” However, 
there is no express provision for enforcement of such obligation. See, e.g., Appellants’ 
Opening Brief at 10, Cross Country Bank v. California, No. A108572 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 
2005), 2005 WL 677738 (observing that in dicta, the trial court in the case had noted that an 
arbitration agreement naming NAF as the provider “might be unenforceable” due to NAF’s 
failure to comply with the California disclosure requirements, but also noting the lack of any 
express provision for such disqualification). But see Honeycutt v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, 
N.A., 236 Cal. Rptr. 3d 255, 270-71 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018) (entering a judgment of vacatur of 
arbitral award in employment matter due to arbitrator’s failure to make disclosures as 
required by California statute and ethics provisions). 
 115. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1394 (2010). 
 116. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3903 (West 2011). 
 117. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-4430 (West 2008). 
 118. Interestingly, the District of Columbia’s reporting requirements also provide for the 
waiver of arbitration fees and costs “for any person having a gross monthly income that is 
less than 300% of the federal poverty guidelines issued annually by the United States 
Department of Health and Human Services.” Id. § 16-4430(d)(1). The District of Columbia’s 
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District of Columbia specifically provides for enforcement by permitting 
any person or entity affected by a violation of the provisions to seek an 
injunction against, and appropriate restitution from, the allegedly violating 
arbitration organization. If the person or entity bringing the action prevails, 
or if the arbitration organization voluntarily complies after the 
commencement of the action, then the arbitration organization can be held 
liable for the person or entity’s attorney’s fees and costs.119 
In addition, the District of Columbia requires each dispute resolution 
provider to disclose any financial interests that the provider has in a party or 
the legal representation of a party, as well as any financial interests that a 
party has in the provider.
120
 This additional requirement is consistent with 
the recommendations of scholars and the CPR-Georgetown Commission on 
Ethics and Standards in the Practice of ADR
121
 and addresses important 
                                                                                                                 
provision also requires dispute resolution organizations to provide notice to consumers 
regarding the potential for waiver of fees. Id. § 16-4430(f). The District of Columbia also 
does not permit arbitrators or arbitration organizations to administer consumer arbitrations 
pursuant to an agreement or rule that requires the non-prevailing consumer to pay the fees 
and costs of the opposing party. Id. § 16-4430(g). See Brief of Appellant, Keeton v. Wells 
Fargo Corp., 987 A.2d 1118 (D.C. 2009) (No. 08-CV-990), in which a consumer argued that 
an arbitration provision should not be enforced because the arbitration provider refused to 
provide for a waiver of fees, despite the requirements of the District of Columbia’s 
provision. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals ultimately required the trial court to 
permit discovery and hold an evidentiary hearing to determine the unconscionability of the 
arbitration agreement. Keeton, 987 A.2d at 1118. 
 119. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-4430(i). 
 120. Id. § 16-4430(h). Maine also requires disclosures regarding financial interest. See 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1394(1)(K) (2010).  
 121. In 2002, the CPR-Georgetown Commission on Ethics and Standards in the Practice 
of ADR published the CPR-Georgetown Principles for ADR Provider Organizations. These 
principles include the following regarding disclosures:  
ADR Provider Organizations should take all reasonable steps to provide clear, 
accurate and understandable information about the following aspects of their 
services and operations:  
a. The nature of the ADR Provider Organization‘s services, operations, 
and fees;  
b. The relevant economic, legal, professional or other relationships 
between the ADR Provider Organization and its affiliated neutrals;  
c. The ADR Provider Organization‘s policies relating to confidentiality, 
organizational and individual conflicts of interests, and ethical 
standards for neutrals and the Organization;  
d. Training and qualifications requirements for neutrals affiliated with 
the Organization, as well as other selection criteria for affiliation; 
and  
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concerns regarding the potential for conflicts of interest. Such concerns 
were heightened after the Minnesota Attorney General brought a highly 
publicized suit against the National Arbitration Forum (“NAF”), a dispute 
resolution provider that conducted consumer arbitrations pursuant to 
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses.
122
 The Attorney General alleged 
that NAF and its operations had become financially entangled with lawyers 
                                                                                                                 
e. The method by which neutrals are selected for service. 
 . . . .  
 . . . The ADR Provider Organization should disclose the existence of any 
interests or relationships which are reasonably likely to affect the impartiality 
or independence of the Organization or which might reasonably create the 
appearance that the Organization is biased against a party or favorable to 
another, including (i) any financial or other interest by the Organization in the 
outcome; (ii) any significant financial, business, organizational, professional or 
other relationship that the Organization has with any of the parties or their 
counsel, including a contractual stream of referrals, a de facto stream of 
referrals, or a funding relationship between a party and the organization; or (iii) 
any other significant source of bias or prejudice concerning the Organization 
which is reasonably likely to affect impartiality or might reasonably create an 
appearance of partiality or bias.  
CPR-GEORGETOWN COMM’N ON ETHICS & STANDARDS OF PRACTICE IN ADR, PRINCIPLES FOR 
ADR PROVIDER ORGANIZATIONS 9-10 (May 1, 2002), https://www.cpradr.org/resource-
center/protocols-guidelines/ethics-codes/principles-for-adr-provider-organizations/_res/ 
id=Attachments/index=0/Principles-for-ADR-Provider-Organizations.pdf [hereinafter 
PRINCIPLES FOR ADR PROVIDER ORGANIZATIONS]; see also Welsh, Mandatory Predispute 
Consumer Arbitration, supra note 6, at 225-26 (suggesting disclosures of the following in 
order to understand the operation of any negotiated or facilitated processes that precede 
arbitration—e.g., “written policies (or performance evaluation factors) to guide employees’ 
decisions regarding the amount of their first [and subsequent] settlement offers to 
consumers”; the number of times that a consumer must refuse “settlement offers in order to 
be offered the full amount of [their] claim”; the length of time that employees wait before 
the consumer’s selection of an arbitrator to offer the full amount requested by a consumer; 
also suggesting disclosure of the following regarding arbitration—e.g., how the “available 
pool of arbitrators [was] selected for these types of cases;” how arbitrators are selected for 
particular cases; the “contractual and financial relationship” between companies and their 
arbitral provider(s); the company’s “share of each arbitral provider's gross and net 
revenues”; the “potential for the arbitral provider, or individual arbitrators, to receive 
bonuses for their work” for a company and the basis for such bonuses; the information that 
the company receives about “the claims made by consumers, the results of these claims and 
the arbitrators responsible for deciding the claims”; how the company has used this 
information; and whether the company has ever used this information to “improve its 
products or services” and, if yes, in what way). 
 122. See generally Welsh, What Is “(Im)partial Enough,” supra note 6, at 427-30. 
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and other actors involved in debt collection matters subject to arbitration.
123
 
NAF subsequently entered into a settlement with the Attorney General and 
discontinued its provision of consumer arbitrations pursuant to mandatory 
pre-dispute arbitration clauses.  
Maine also requires a disclosure regarding financial interests that could 
represent a conflict of interest. In addition, the consumer protection division 
of Maine’s Office of the Attorney General is directly involved in 
publicizing dispute resolution providers’ disclosures to consumers. 
Specifically, each dispute resolution provider must notify the Attorney 
General of the website where its disclosures are posted (and must provide 
notification of the discontinuation of the use of such website), and the 
Attorney General is required to include links on its own publicly accessible 
website.
124
 
Maryland varies from both California and Maine in additionally 
requiring disclosure of the address where a consumer arbitration was 
conducted.
125
  
F. Disclosures by Users of Dispute Resolution Services  
Some proponents of international commercial and investor-state 
arbitration have pioneered online initiatives that empower users of dispute 
resolution services to publicize information regarding their experience with 
international arbitrators and arbitration.
126
 For example, the non-profit 
organization Arbitrator Intelligence solicits arbitral awards from users and 
posts them online. In addition, Arbitrator Intelligence uses a two-phase 
Arbitrator Intelligence Questionnaire (“AIQ”) to collect both objective 
                                                                                                                 
 123. Id.; Consent Decree, Minnesota v. Nat’l Arbitration Forum, No. 27-CV-07-18550 
(Minn. Dist. Ct. July 17, 2009), http://pubcit.typepad.com/files/nafconsentdecree.pdf; 
Deepak Gupta, Consent Decree in Minnesota v. NAF, Pub. Citizen (July 20, 2009, 11:38 
AM), http://pubcit.typepad.com/clpblog/2009/07/consent-decree-in-minnesota-v-naf.html 
(press release regarding the consent decree). 
 124. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1394(2) (West 2010).  
 125. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3903(a)(11) (West 2011). Maryland also varies 
from both California and Maine in not requiring disclosures regarding the arbitration of 
employment-related disputes or the number of times that a non-consumer has been a party in 
a mediation conducted by the disclosing dispute resolution organization. Id. § 14-3903(a)(2), 
(5).  
 126. See, e.g., Contribute an Award, ARB. INTELLIGENCE, https://web.archive.org/web/ 
20180630230841/http://www.arbitratorintelligence.org/contribute-award/ (last visited Jan. 
13, 2019). The same trend is occurring for international commercial mediation. See e.g., 
Find IMI-Certified Professionals, INT’L MEDIATION INST., https://imimediation.org/certified-
mediator-search (last visited Jan. 13, 2019). 
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information and subjective assessments from users and counsel regarding 
individual arbitrators’ case management (e.g., ordering of interim measures 
and document production), decision-making (e.g., interpretive 
methodologies), and timeliness in the issuance of awards.
127
 When enough 
anonymized data has been collected as a result of users’ completion of 
questionnaires, Arbitrator Intelligence intends to publish “AI Reports” 
regarding individual arbitrators.
128
 These reports will be available, for a fee, 
to users, counsel, institutions, and arbitrators, provided that the profiled 
arbitrator consents to such publication.
129
 The underlying data that 
Arbitrator Intelligence gathered also will be made available to cooperating 
arbitral institutions.
130
 
Consumer advocates and academics have urged similar initiatives for 
domestic consumer arbitration. Professor Lisa Amsler, for example, has 
proposed that one-shot players might increase transparency and improve 
their experience in consumer arbitration if they are trained to identify key 
procedural elements and then upload their assessments and other 
information to an online platform that would be widely accessible—and 
potentially quite influential in the aggregate (e.g., TripAdvisor).
131
 Based in 
part on suggestions made during a National Roundtable on Consumer 
                                                                                                                 
 127. See FAQs About the AIQ, ARB. INTELLIGENCE, https://www.arbitratorintelligence. 
org/faq// (last visited Jan. 13, 2019). 
 128. See id. (answering the question “How will information from the AIQs be made 
available?”). 
 129. See id. (answering the question “How does the AIQ ensure that feedback is fair to 
arbitrators?”). 
 130. See id.; see also About Us, ARB. INTELLIGENCE, https://www.arbitratorintelligence. 
org/about-us (last visited Jan. 13, 2019); Linda Gharib, Wolters Kluwer Announces 
Collaboration with Arbitrator Intelligence, WOLTERS KLUWER (June 26, 2017), 
https://wolterskluwer.com/company/newsroom/news/2017/06/wolters-kluwer-announces-
collaboration-with-arbitrator-intelligence.html.  
 131. See Amsler, supra note 6; see also Alyson Carrel & Alan Boudreau, Crowdsourcing 
and Mediation: A New Approach to Social Justice Critiques, Presentation at ABA Dispute 
Resolution Section Annual Conference (Apr. 17, 2015) and Association of Conflict 
Resolution (Mar. 25, 2015), http://tinyurl.com/crowdsourcing-mediation; Alyson Carrel & 
Alan Boudreau, Crowdsourcing: Can Today's Technology Answer Yesterday's Social Justice 
Critique of Mediation? (n.d.) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (proposing use of 
crowdsourcing to bring transparency to mediated settlements, referencing glassdoor.com and 
others for potential templates, and noting that questions regarding confidentiality and 
logistics must be resolved); see also Carrie Menkel-Meadow & Robert Dingwall, 
Negotiating with Scripts and Playbooks: What to Do When Big Bad Companies Won’t 
Negotiate, in THE NEGOTIATOR’S DESK REFERENCE 717-18 (Christopher Honeyman & 
Andrea Kupfer Schneider eds., 2017). 
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Arbitration,
132
 Professor Tom Stipanowich developed a “Fairness Index” 
that users similarly could access in order to provide feedback on arbitration 
services.
133
 
There are some particularly notable examples of institutional repeat 
players’ willingness to cooperate with the publication of information 
regarding their internal dispute resolution programs. Professor Alan 
Morrison, for example, has used the annual reports published by the Office 
of the Independent Administrator—which administers arbitrations between 
Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. and its health plan members in 
California—to assess the fairness of Kaiser Permanente’s mandatory 
medical malpractice arbitration program.
134
 Professor Morrison has called 
for others to engage in greater in-depth analysis of this program, with 
access to data beyond what was contained in the annual reports.
135
 
  
                                                                                                                 
 132. See STIPANOWICH ET AL., supra note 6; see also Nancy A. Welsh & Lipsky, “Moving 
the Ball Forward,” supra note 7. 
 133. See Stipanowich, The Arbitration Fairness Index, supra note 6, at 991-92. See 
generally Thomas J. Stipanowich, An “Arbitration Fairness Index”: A Rating System for 
Consumer and Employment Arbitration Programs, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2013, at 30. 
 134. See Alan B. Morrison, Can Mandatory Arbitration of Medical Malpractice Claims 
Be Fair? The Kaiser Permanente System, 70 DISP. RESOL. J. 35, 35-36 (2015) (using 
available data to determine whether this type of mandatory arbitration can be “operated in a 
manner in which those who must use it to resolve their claims receive a fair hearing and a 
reasonable opportunity to recover their damages”). These reports include information on the 
process used to close cases, time to closure, claimants’ win rates, and parties’ and counsel’s 
assessments of the arbitrators and process. Morrison supplemented his review of the annual 
reports with interviews with the independent Administrator and Kaiser-Permanente officials. 
Id. Also, it should be noted that Kaiser Permanente developed its current arbitration program 
following the California Supreme Court’s severe criticism of the prior program in Engalla v. 
Permanente Medical Group, 938 P.2d 903 (Cal. 1997). Morrison, supra, at 36; see also 
Stephanie Smith & Janet Martinez, An Analytic Framework for Dispute System Design, 14 
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 123, 134-44 (2009) (describing the design process that led to Kaiser 
Permanente’s current arbitration program). 
 135. See Morrison, supra note 134, at 59 n.71. Notably, Professor Morrison concluded 
that Kaiser Permanente’s arbitration system was less expensive for claimants and thus made 
it more possible to bring small- and medium-size claims, was faster than litigation, permitted 
claimants to present their cases fully, and produced “reasonably just” outcomes. Id. at 59. He 
added that “[t]he loss of a public trial before a jury is a negative, but whether it outweighs 
the positives is a question that will not be answered in the same way by everyone.” Id.  
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G. Proposed Transparency Requirements for ODR 
A last recent development involves online dispute resolution (“ODR”). 
Increasingly, courts, agencies, and repeat litigants (e.g., insurers, 
manufacturers, employers) are expressing interest in using ODR to resolve 
relatively routine, low-dollar disputes. ODR creates the opportunity for 
collecting and analyzing substantial amounts of data, which can then be 
used to detect problematic patterns.
136
 At the same time, the public is 
increasingly aware of the dangers presented by involvement with the online 
world, including the potential for security breaches,
137
 victimization as a 
result of inaccurate information,
138
 and unfairness as a result of biased 
                                                                                                                 
 136. See Orna Rabinovich-Einy & Ethan Katsh, The New New Courts, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 
165, 192 (2017). Rabonivich-Einy and Katsh described data collected and used by British 
Columbia’s Civil Resolution Tribunal (CRT): 
The CRT team constantly seeks feedback from both satisfied and unsatisfied 
users to improve the process, identify problems, and replicate successful 
elements. They collect data in a myriad of ways available only because of the 
CRT’s online nature: active user input given through rating and ranking, open 
text boxes, ex-post feedback, and analysis of dispute resolution data. Indeed, 
CRT developers have devoted significant efforts and resources to the 
development and refinement of categorizations of claims and defenses in order 
to allow for meaningful use of the data. Such data helps to improve the CRT 
and the diagnosis phase, and, perhaps more importantly, helps prevent future 
claims.  
As the CRT team has recognized, learning from data and prevention of 
problems need not be limited to the improvement of the system itself, but could 
be viewed as a broader goal of the legal system. As use of online systems 
expands and data is stored and studied more extensively by courts, they will be 
able to detect, through such indicators as spikes in particular claims, that there 
is a regulatory gap or a need for better enforcement of existing laws in certain 
areas. In this way, dispute resolution data collected in courts can be used to 
prevent future disputes from occurring. 
Id. 
 137. See, e.g., Nick Clements, Equifax’s Enormous Data Breach Just Got Even Bigger, 
FORBES (Mar. 5, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/nickclements/2018/03/05/ 
equifaxs-enormous-data-breach-just-got-even-bigger/#479b18dc53bc; Reuters, Target 
Settles 2013 Hacked Customer Data Breach for $18.5 Million, NBC NEWS (May 24, 2017), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/business/business-news/target-settles-2013-hacked-customer-
data-breach-18-5-million-n764031. 
 138. See, e.g., Aaron Klein, The Real Problem with Credit Reports Is the Astounding 
Number of Errors, CNBC (Sept. 27, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/09/27/the-real-
problem-with-credit-reports-is-the-astounding-number-of-errors-equifax-commentary.html. 
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algorithms.
139
 Consequently, many ODR advocates are calling for ODR 
procedures to be made transparent and accountable, with required reporting 
regarding the number of people using them, their substantive results, users’ 
perceptions of the ODR process’s fairness, demographic patterns, and the 
results of algorithmic audits.
140
  
                                                                                                                 
 139. See Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH U. L. REV. 1249, 
1257 (2008) (discussing the Terrorist Surveillance Program and warning that 
“unsophisticated algorithms and faulty data” can “generate high rates of false positives” that 
then “serve as a basis for baseless, stigmatizing criminal investigations”); Anjanette H. 
Raymond, Emma Arrington Stone Young & Scott J. Shackelford, Building a Better HAL 
9000: Algorithms, the Market, and the Need to Prevent the Engraining of Bias, 15 NW. J. 
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 215, 222-40 (2018) [hereinafter Raymond, Engraining of Bias] 
(including discussion of predictive policing); Anjanette H. Raymond & Scott J. Shackelford, 
Technology, Ethics, and Access to Justice: Should an Algorithm Be Deciding Your Case?, 35 
MICH. J. INT’L L. 485 (2014) [hereinafter Raymond & Shackelford, Access to Justice]. 
 140. See, e.g., JOINT TECH. COMM’N, JTC RESOURCE BULLETIN: ODR FOR COURTS 15-16 
(version 2.0, Nov. 29, 2017) (“Processes and algorithms that impact decisions should be 
available for scrutiny.”); Dafna Lavi, Three Is Not a Crowd: Online Mediation-Arbitration 
in Business to Consumer Internet Disputes, 37 U. PA. J. INTL. L. 871, 932-33, 936 (2016) 
(citing Amy J. Schmitz, “Drive-Thru” Arbitration in the Digital Age: Empowering 
Consumers Through Binding ODR, 62 BAYLOR L. REV. 178, 198 (2010)) (discussing 
trustmarks, with reporting to regulatory agencies for failure to comply with requirements of 
trustmarks, and online posting of consumers’ opinions regarding ODR services); 
Rabinovich-Einy & Katsh, supra note 136, at 211 (calling for transparency in a court-based 
public online dispute resolution system regarding any use of Big Data for dispute prevention 
activities and observing that such transparency could serve as a model for private ODR 
systems); Anjanette H. Raymond, A Meeting of the Minds: Online Dispute Resolution 
Regulations Should Be Opportunity Focused, 16 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 189, 211, 214 (2016) 
(calling for a “transparent system” that provides “information to consumers, allowing 
aggregation of data to reveal contractual discrimination, and lessening information 
imbalances that erode trust and hinder an open system of justice” as well as a platform that is 
“monitored with an eye toward eliminating all types of bias and/or undue or improper 
influence”); Anjanette Raymond & Scott J. Shackelford, Jury Glasses: Wearable 
Technology and Its Role in Crowdsourcing Justice, 17 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 115, 
148 (2015) (arguing for the creation of a platform auditor that tracks and analyzes outcomes 
and checks coding and presentation for intentional and unintentional influences contained 
within the system); Scott J. Shackelford & Anjanette H. Raymond, Building the Virtual 
Courthouse: Ethical Considerations for Design, Implementation, and Regulation in the 
World of ODR, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 615, 634; Nancy A. Welsh, ODR: A Time for Celebration 
and the Embrace of Procedural Safeguards, Address Before the 15th ODR Conference (May 
23, 2016), http://www.adrhub.com/profiles/blogs/procedural-justice-in-odr (calling for 
algorithmic audits and alternative forums for those who do not have access to, or facility 
with, online options); see also Suzanne Van Arsdale, User Protections in Online Dispute 
Resolution, 21 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 107, 128–29 (2015); Noam Ebner & John Zeleznikow, 
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The example of federal and state courts, as well as the developments 
involving quasi-public and private organizations and self-help initiatives as 
described supra, strongly suggest a trend toward some degree of 
transparency—what this Article will term “measured transparency”—in 
order to assure the integrity and trustworthiness of “private” dispute 
resolution processes. It is at this point, then, that this Article turns to dispute 
resolution neutrals’ ethical obligations and their relationship with 
transparency. 
IV. Dispute Resolution Ethics and Transparency: Focus on the Model 
Standards of Conduct for Mediators 
In light of the Article’s primary focus to this point on the value of 
transparency in connection with the use and outcomes of mandatory pre-
dispute consumer and employment arbitration, it would be reasonable to 
turn now to the Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes. 
After examining the ethical obligations of arbitrators, the Article might then 
begin to consider other dispute resolution neutrals’ ethics—e.g., 
mediators,
141
 dispute resolution organizations,
142
 ODR providers,
143
 
ombudspersons,
144
 and even state
145
 and federal judges.
146
  
                                                                                                                 
Fairness, Trust and Security in Online Dispute Resolution, 36 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 
143 (2015); Noam Ebner & John Zeleznikow, No Sheriff in Town: Governance for Online 
Dispute Resolution, 32 NEGOT. J. 297 (2016); Menkel-Meadow & Dingwall, supra note 131; 
Orna Rabinovich-Einy & Ethan Katsh, Digital Justice: Reshaping Boundaries in an Online 
Dispute Resolution Environment, 1 INT’L J. ONLINE DISP. RESOL. 5, 28 (2014); Raymond & 
Shackelford, Access to Justice, supra note 139; SCHMITZ & RULE, supra note 84; Amy J. 
Schmitz, Secret Consumer Scores and Segmentations: Separating “Haves” from “Have-
Nots,” 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1411; Leah Wing, Ethical Principles for Online Dispute 
Resolution: A GPS Device for the Field, 3 INTL. J. ON ONLINE DISP. RESOL. 12, 25 (2016) 
(calling for the accountability as one of a proposed set of ethical principles for online dispute 
resolution). These calls for transparency join those made by information privacy scholars 
who point to technology’s challenge to the efficacy of current procedural due process 
jurisprudence. See Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 
1249 (2008). 
141. See generally MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS PMBL. (AM. 
ARBITRATION ASS’N, AM. BAR ASS’N, AND ASS’N FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION 2005) 
[hereinafter MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT]. 
 142. See generally PRINCIPLES FOR ADR PROVIDER ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 121. 
 143. See generally Ethical Principles for Online Dispute Resolution, ODR.INFO, 
http://odr.info/ethics-and-odr/ (last visited Nov. 30, 2018). 
 144. See generally IOA Code of Ethics, INT’L OMBUDSMAN ASS’N (rev. Jan. 2007), 
http://www.ombudsassociation.org/IOA_Main/media/SiteFiles/Code_Ethics_1-07.pdf. 
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Because there are now discussions regarding potential revisions to the 
Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators, however, the Article will turn 
at this point to the ethical obligations of mediators. As noted previously, the 
use of mediation is mimicking arbitration in key respects. Mandatory 
mediation is most frequently associated with courts, but private contracts of 
adhesion increasingly contain mandatory pre-dispute mediation clauses. 
Thus, like consumer and employment arbitration, mediation is imposed 
upon parties, and many commentators have raised concerns over the years 
about the fairness of the process for those who are less powerful.
147
 Most 
                                                                                                                 
 145. See generally MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018). 
 146. See generally CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES (U.S. COURTS 2018). 
It is worth noting that judges and lawyers might also reasonably be expected to support 
transparency as a means to protect the integrity of the judicial system. However, this is not 
the case. Indeed, it is striking how many lawyers opt out of the judicial system and into 
arbitration for disputes with their clients over fees or malpractice. Neither the ABA Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct nor ABA ethics opinions require any data or general 
transparency regarding the extent of this practice. Rather, the ABA requires only that 
lawyers make disclosures to their clients regarding the arbitration provisions contained in 
retainer agreements, gain the clients’ informed consent, and provide for the availability of 
common law or statutory remedies. See Feldman v. Davis, 53 So.3d 1132, 1136-37 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2011); Brian Cressman, Comment, Bezio v. Draeger: A Missed Opportunity 
for a Doctrinal Solution to the Jurisdictional Split as to the Arbitrability of Legal 
Malpractice Claims, 6 Y.B. ON ARB. & MEDIATION 359 (2014); Terese Schireson, Comment, 
The Ethical Lawyer-Client Arbitration Clause, 87 TEMP. L. REV. 547 (2015); Chrissy L. 
Schwennsen, Case Note, Arbitration Clauses in Fee Retainer Agreements, 3 ST. MARY’S J. 
LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 330 (2013) (surveying state and ABA ethics opinions, 
provisions); ABA Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 02-425 (2002) 
(finding arbitration clause permissible if client is fully apprised of advantages and 
disadvantages to permit informed decision and clause does not insulate lawyer from liability 
or limit liability to which she would otherwise be exposed under common or statutory law); 
Prof’l Ethics, Comm. for the State Bar of Tex., Op. No. 586 (2008) (requiring informed 
consent, requiring clause to be fair and reasonable to client; referencing Rule 1.08, Comment 
2); see also Susan Sabb Fortney, A Tort in Search of a Remedy: Prying Open the Courthouse 
Doors for Legal Malpractice Victims, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2033 (2017). 
 147. See Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of 
Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359; Trina Grillo, The 
Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545 (1991); Carol 
Izumi, Implicit Bias and the Illusion of Mediator Neutrality, 34 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 71 
(2010); Nancy A. Welsh, Remembering the Role of Justice in Resolution: Insights from 
Procedural and Social Justice Theory, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 49 (2004); Eric K. Yamamoto, 
ADR: Where Have the Critics Gone?, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1055 (1996). In 2017, SMU 
Law Review published a two-part symposium issue reconsidering these critiques of ADR. 
The issue included articles by Professors Delgado, Michael Green, Carol Izumi, Andrea 
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recently, legislative mandates to participate in foreclosure mediation have 
triggered particular attention to these concerns.
148
 
Even though there is currently no federal statute
149
 providing for narrow 
and deferential judicial review or expedited judicial enforcement of 
mediated settlement agreements, traditional legal research
150
 and available 
metrics
151
 suggest that federal and state courts tend to treat mediated 
settlement agreements as “super-contracts”152 with nearly automatic 
entitlement to judicial support and enforcement. An international 
                                                                                                                 
Schneider, Nancy Welsh, Eric Yamamoto, Deborah Hensler, Pat Chew, Sarah Cole, Charles 
Craver and Lisa Blomgren Amsler, among others. Gilat Bachar and Professor Deborah 
Hensler undertook to identify all of the empirical efforts to test Professor Delgado’s 
hypothesis that mediation (and arbitration) create systematic differences in dispute resolution 
outcomes by gender, race, ethnicity, or socio-economic status. Ultimately, they found the 
results to be contrary and inconclusive, and they called for such research to be undertaken. 
Gilat J. Bachar & Deborah R. Hensler, Does Alternative Dispute Resolution Facilitate 
Prejudice and Bias? We Still Don’t Know, 70 SMU L. REV. 817, 829-30 (2017).  
 148. See Lydia Nussbaum, ADR’s Place in Foreclosure: Remedying the Flaws of a 
Securitized Housing Market, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1889, 1946 n.242 (2013) [hereinafter 
Nussbaum, ADR’s Place] (citing Admin. Office of the Courts, Supreme Court of Nev., 
Foreclosure Mediation Program Beneficiary Compliance Outcomes (2012), 
http://www.nevadajudiciary.us/index.php/viewdocumentsandforms/func-startdown/8318 
[hereinafter Foreclosure Mediation Program] (detailing the extent to which the six primary 
loan servicers in Nevada (Bank of America, Wells Fargo, JP Morgan Chase, Ally/GMAC, 
US Bank, CitiGroup) and others complied with statutory requirements of the state 
foreclosure mediation program, such as attendance at mediation, production of required 
documents, authority to negotiate, and good faith participation)); Lydia Nussbaum, 
Mediation as Regulation: Expanding State Governance over Private Disputes, 2016 UTAH 
L. REV. 361, 412 [hereinafter Nussbaum, Mediation as Regulation] (pointing out that the 
foreclosure crisis ultimately required the creation of the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau and legal action by the U.S. Department of Justice and the state attorneys general 
from forty-nine states and the District of Columbia, and observing that “policymakers need 
to be aware that, while it may appear more politically expedient to require parties to mediate 
and then shape their behavior within the context of mediation, direct government 
intervention may be required to achieve the intended policy outcome”).  
 149. In contrast, the Federal Arbitration Act provides very limited grounds for vacating 
an arbitral award, and the courts have developed a deferential standard of review. See Welsh, 
Mandatory Predispute Consumer Arbitration, supra note 6, at 206. 
 150. See Welsh, Thinning Vision, supra note 4, at 59-78. 
 151. See Coben & Thompson, supra note 4, at 74. 
 152. See LEONARD L. RISKIN ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS 483 (5th ed. 
2014); see also Lydia Nussbaum, Trial and Error: Legislating ADR for Medical Malpractice 
Reform, 76 MD. L. REV. 247, 269 (2017) (describing, in the medical malpractice context, 
how some states have “deputiz[ed] screening panels to formalize settlement agreements and 
render them binding so parties can skip going to court for a final judgment and order”). 
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convention to formalize expedited enforcement of mediated settlement 
agreements, meanwhile, has recently been adopted by the United Nations 
General Assembly.
153
  
All of these developments indicate that establishing an appropriate 
degree of transparency is relevant for mediation.
154
 
                                                                                                                 
 153. The United Nations Convention on International Settlement Agreements Resulting 
from Mediation will be known as the "Singapore Convention on Mediation." See Press 
Release, U.N. Info. Serv., General Assembly Adopts the United Nations Convention on 
International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation (Dec. 21, 2018), http:// 
www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/en/pressrels/2018/unisl271.html. The Singapore Convention is 
modeled upon the New York Convention, which requires signatory nations’ courts to 
recognize and enforce international commercial arbitration awards with only narrow grounds 
for the denial of such enforcement. Article 1 of the Singapore Convention specifically 
excludes employment, family, and consumer matters. See Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Rep. 
on the Work of Its Fifty-First Session, U.N. Doc. A/73/496, at 11, https://undocs.org/ 
en/A/73/496. The UNCITRAL Working Group’s documents regarding the Singapore 
Convention are available at Working Group II: 2000 to Present: Arbitration and 
Conciliation / Dispute Settlement, UNCITRAL, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/ 
commission/working_groups/2Arbitration.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2018). See also Hal 
Abramson, New Singapore Convention on Cross-Border Mediated Settlements: Key 
Choices, in MEDIATION IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL AND INVESTMENT DISPUTES 
(Catharine Titi & Katia FachGomez eds., Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2019); S. I. 
Strong, Realizing Rationality: An Empirical Assessment of International Commercial 
Mediation, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1973 (2016); Ellen E. Deason, Enforcement of 
Settlement Agreements in International Commercial Mediation: A New Legal Framework?, 
DISP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 2015, at 32; Luke Nottage, In/formalization and Glocalisation of 
International Commercial Arbitration and Investment Treaty Arbitration in Asia, in 
FORMALISATION AND FLEXIBILISATION IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 67, at 211 
(pointing to lack of expedited enforceability as one reason for mediation’s lack of success in 
moving into the international commercial arbitration or investor state arbitration context; 
also as a reason that elite law firms continue to dominate the international dispute resolution 
world). 
 154.  In some respects, mediation presents a more difficult case than arbitration because 
the process promises confidentiality in order to encourage the candor and free flow of 
information needed to arrive at settlements. Indeed, Professor Lydia Nussbaum has pointed 
out the conflict that can exist between mediation’s promise of confidentiality and state 
legislatures’ policy goals in mandating mediation, particularly in the foreclosure context: 
[M]aking decisions about policy reform requires access to information, but the 
mediation process can obscure information with its confidentiality protections 
and individualized approach to dispute resolution. Therefore, legislatures 
should spend time considering whether “nudging” more disputes to resolve out 
of the public eye, erodes transparency and undermines the state’s interest in 
protecting consumers. Will families be able to assess the safety practices of an 
adult care home if previous complaints were resolved in confidential mediation 
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Therefore, this Article now turns to the Model Standards of Conduct for 
Mediators (“Model Standards”) originally adopted by the American Bar 
Association’s Section of Dispute Resolution, American Arbitration 
Association, and Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution (“SPIDR”) 
in 1994, and then revised and adopted as revised by the American Bar 
Association, AAA, and ACR (the successor to SPIDR) in 2005. The Model 
Standards have been very influential. Most courts, bar associations, and 
other organizations in the United States have looked to the Model Standards 
as templates for ethical requirements for their mediators.
155
  
The Model Standards certainly invoke the importance of gaining and 
retaining the public’s trust and protecting the integrity of the mediation 
process. The Preamble, for example, quickly establishes that one of the 
Standards’ primary goals is “to promote public confidence in mediation as a 
process for resolving disputes.”156 Neither here nor elsewhere, however, do 
the Model Standards provide for any duty actually owed by mediators to 
                                                                                                                 
sessions? How can consumer advocates identify patterns of misconduct by loan 
servicers or telecommunications carriers if individual claims are resolved 
quietly, one at a time? Whether the state should relinquish its power over 
dispute resolution outcomes, and whether parties, often unequally matched, can 
actually regulate each other in settlement negotiations, are questions hotly 
debated by scholars. Policymakers should be thoughtful about what kinds of 
disputes may have significance to the public. Some existing proposals for 
preserving public information while encouraging settlement include requiring 
parties to report the outcome of settlements negotiated in mediation in a 
national database or for the parties themselves to make mediated settlement 
terms publically [sic] available. 
Nussbaum, Mediation as Regulation, supra note 148, at 412-13. Others have pointed to the 
confidentiality offered by mediation as a means to avoid the increasing transparency of 
arbitration. See, e.g., Shahla F. Ali & Odysseas G. Repousis, Investor-State Mediation and 
the Rise of Transparency in International Investment Law: Opportunity or Threat?, 45 
DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 225, 228-29 (2017) (“If this treaty [for the enforcement of 
mediated settlement agreements] were to be concluded, would it mean that investor-state 
mediation would not only be a convenient method to avoid the high levels of transparency 
now paradigmatic to investor-state arbitration, but would also enjoy high levels of 
international enforceability?”). 
 155. See RISKIN ET AL., supra note 152, at 401. There are exceptions, of course. In 
Florida, for example, the ethics provisions regulating court-certified mediators (as well as 
mediators handling court-connected cases) preceded the 1994 Model Standards. 
 156. MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT, supra note 141, at pmbl.. 
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demonstrate to the public on a systemic basis that the mediation process is 
deserving of trust and confidence.
157
 
Meanwhile, the Model Standards frequently reference mediators’ duty to 
protect the integrity of the mediation process in individual cases. For 
example, Standard III, “Conflicts of Interest,” provides that while a 
mediator is required to disclose conflicts of interest, she is also required to 
withdraw from or decline to proceed with a mediation when the conflict 
“might reasonably be viewed as undermining the integrity of mediation.”158 
Also pursuant to Standard III, a mediator is required to avoid establishing a 
relationship with a mediation participant if “that would raise questions 
about the integrity of the mediation.”159 Standard VII, “Advertising and 
Solicitation,” provides that a mediator’s solicitations for business must be 
constrained in order to avoid “giv[ing] the appearance of partiality for or 
against a party or otherwise undermin[ing] the integrity of the process.”160 
In addition to focusing on individual cases rather than systemic needs, these 
standards consistently establish what a mediator must not do. A mediator 
must not proceed to serve as a mediator if a conflict of interest exists. A 
mediator must not establish a relationship with a mediation participant. A 
mediator must not engage in troublesome business solicitations. All of these 
prohibitions exist to protect the integrity of the mediation process. No 
standard referencing integrity establishes an affirmative requirement, 
however, such as taking action to support reasonable—or “measured”161—
transparency regarding the use or outcomes of the mediation process.
162
 
                                                                                                                 
 157. See Omer Shapira, A Critical Assessment of the Model Standards of Conduct for 
Mediators (2005): Call for Reform, 100 MARQ. L. REV. 81, 95-104 (2016) (urging that the 
Model Standards should be revised to make it clear that mediators owe a duty to the public, 
not just the parties); see also Alyson Carrel & Lin Adrian, Regulating Mediator Practice, 
DISP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 2017, at 21, 23 (distinguishing the Model Standards from the 
mediation statutes and rules developed in Florida; noting that the Florida rules “don’t just 
discuss promoting public confidence as an aspirational goal but explicitly state that these 
rules are meant to ‘ensure protection of the participants in mediation and the public.’”). 
 158. MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT, supra note 141, at Standard III.E. Christopher 
Honeyman has chronicled situational and structural biases in mediation that actually are 
endemic to the process—e.g., a situational bias toward the interests of the party that 
provided or hired the mediator, a structural bias toward moderates as compared to radicals—
that may be best resolved by disclosure. See Christopher Honeyman, Patterns of Bias in 
Mediation, 1985 MO. J. DISP. RESOL. 141, 142-43, 146. 
 159. MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT, supra note 141, at Standard III.F. 
 160. Id. at Standard VII.B. 
 161. The term “measured transparency” comes from Dispute Resolution Data. See What 
Does the Data Show?, supra note 96 (“The use of data in international commercial 
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Standards IV, “Competence,” and VI, “Quality of the Process,” provide 
for some affirmative ethical obligations regarding the assurance of quality, 
but their scope is limited to the parties participating in a mediation. For 
example, Standard IV notes that “[a] person who offers to serve as a 
mediator creates the expectation that the person is competent to mediate 
effectively” and urges that a mediator should both attend relevant 
educational programs and make available to the parties information that is 
“relevant to the mediator’s training, education, experience and approach in 
conducting a mediation.”163 Standard VI provides that a mediator must 
conduct a mediation “in a manner that promotes . . . party participation 
[and] procedural fairness.”164 If a party appears to have difficulty 
comprehending the process, issues, or settlement options, or difficulty 
participating in a mediation, then the mediator should explore the 
circumstances and potential accommodations, modifications, or adjustments 
that would make possible the party’s capacity to comprehend, participate, 
and exercise self-determination. These actions certainly are consistent with 
a mediator’s obligation to protect the integrity of the mediation process, but 
it is noteworthy that their reach is entirely limited to the mediator’s 
interaction with the parties participating in mediation.  
Standard IX, “Advancement of Mediation Practice,” is the only standard 
that begins to hint at the value of monitoring mediation and providing 
information about the process to the larger public. This standard provides 
that a mediator should “act in a manner that advances the practice of 
                                                                                                                 
arbitrations and mediations, measured transparency, and the opportunity for new scholarly 
research has arrived!”). 
 162. Interestingly, even though Standard IV, Competence, does not specifically reference 
the need to consider the public and protect the integrity of the mediation process, the 
Reporter’s Notes observe: 
The Model Standards (September 2005) retains the commitment expressed in 
the 1994 Version that the Standards not create artificial or arbitrary barriers to 
serve the public as a mediator. But to promote public confidence in the integrity 
and usefulness of the process and to protect the members of the public, an 
individual representing himself or herself as a mediator must be committed to 
serving only in those situations for which he or she possesses the basic 
competency to assist. 
Joseph B. Stulberg, Reporter’s Notes, JOINT COMM. FOR MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT 
FOR MEDIATORS 14 (Sept. 9, 2005), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/ 
2011_build/dispute_resolution/mscm_reporternotes.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter 
Reporter’s Notes].  
 163. MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT, supra note 141, at Standard IV.A. 
 164. Id. at Standard VI.A. 
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mediation” and may promote the standard by “[p]articipating in research 
when given the opportunity, including obtaining participant feedback when 
appropriate.”165 Standard V, “Confidentiality,” however, cautions that “[i]f 
a mediator participates in . . . research or evaluation of mediation, the 
mediator should protect the anonymity of the parties and abide by their 
reasonable expectations regarding confidentiality.”166 
Interestingly, in 2001, the American Bar Association’s House of 
Delegates adopted standards for the mediation of family and divorce 
matters that included an appendix with special policy considerations for the 
state regulation of family mediators and court-affiliated programs. Two of 
these special considerations make clear that confidentiality could and 
should co-exist with sufficient transparency to ensure consumer protection. 
Specifically, the Appendix provides:  
. . . Individual states or local courts should set standards and 
qualifications for family mediators including procedures for 
evaluations and handling grievances against mediators. In 
developing these standards and qualifications, regulators should 
consult with appropriate professional groups, including 
professional associations of family mediators. 
. . . . 
. . . Confidentiality should not be construed to limit or prohibit 
the effective monitoring, research or evaluation of mediation 
programs by responsible individuals or academic institutions 
provided that no identifying information about any person 
involved in the mediation is disclosed without their prior written 
consent. Under appropriate circumstances, researchers may be 
permitted to obtain access to statistical data and, with the 
permission of the participants, to individual case files, 
observations of live mediations, and interviews with 
participants.
167
 
                                                                                                                 
 165. Id. at Standard IX. 
 166. Id. at Standard V.A. 
 167. See Ass’n of Family & Conciliation Courts, Model Standards of Practice for Family 
and Divorce Mediation, MEDIATE, Standard XIII, https://www.mediate.com/ 
articles/afccstds.cfm (last visited Dec. 11, 2018) (adopted by the American Bar Association, 
Association of Family and Conciliation Courts, Association for Conflict Resolution and 
Mediate.com) [hereinafter Ass’n of Family & Conciliation Courts, Model Standards of 
 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019
872 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:823 
 
 
 
The failure of the subsequently adopted 2005 Model Standards to include 
this sort of clear endorsement of measured transparency for court-connected 
mediation is both noteworthy and confusing. The International Mediation 
Institute (IMI) Code of Conduct provides another model for encouraging 
accountability. Standard 1.3.2 makes mediators’ solicitation of parties’ 
feedback mandatory.
168
  
There have been efforts to encourage reporting and greater transparency 
regarding mediation. Not long after the adoption of the 2005 Standards, for 
example, the ABA Section of Dispute Resolution’s Research and Statistics 
Task Force, chaired by Professor Lisa Bingham (now Amsler), developed a 
list of key data elements that every court should collect on mediation 
programs.
169
 Resolution Systems Institute (RSI), in collaboration with the 
ABA Section of Dispute Resolution, undertook a multi-year initiative to 
develop model post-mediation questionnaires
170
 in order to increase public 
knowledge regarding the incidence and effects of court-connected 
mediation. In 2012, the ABA Section of Dispute Resolution’s Task Force 
on Mediator Credentialing recommended that mediator-credentialing 
organizations provide accessible, transparent systems to register 
                                                                                                                 
Practice]; Model Standards of Practice for Family and Divorce Mediation, AM. BAR ASS’N 
(Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/child_law/resources/attorneys/model_ 
standards_ofpracticeforfamiliesindivorcemediation.html (approving these Model Standards); 
see also Margaret Shaw et al., National Standards for Court-Connected Mediation 
Programs, 31 FAMILY & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 156 (1993) (proposing evaluation and 
grievance procedures for court mediation programs). 
 168. Standard 1.3.2, Appointment, provides that “Mediators shall advise parties that they 
will be invited to offer the Mediator feedback on the process at any stage, including offering 
written feedback at the conclusion of the mediation,” and Standard 4.4, Feedback, provides: 
Unless inappropriate in the circumstances, Mediators will, at the conclusion of 
a mediation, invite the parties and advisers and any co-mediators or assistant 
mediators, to complete an IMI Feedback Request Form and return it to the 
Mediator or to the Reviewer indicated by the Mediator in his/her IMI Profile to 
assist in the preparation of the Mediator's Feedback Digest. 
Code of Professional Conduct, INT’L MEDIATION INST., §§ 1.3.2, 4.4, https://www. 
imimediation.org/practitioners/code-professional-conduct/ (last visited Dec. 11, 2018). 
 169. See Memorandum from Section of Dispute Resolution Task Force on Research and 
Statistics, Am. Bar Ass’n, to Court Adm’rs & ADR Program Adm’rs, Top Ten Pieces of 
Information Courts Should Collect on ADR (June 9, 2006), https://www.americanbar. 
org/content/dam/aba/events/dispute_resolution/cle_and_mtg_planning_board/teleconference
s/2012-2013/May_2013/topten.authcheckdam.pdf.  
 170. See Model Surveys, RESOL. SYS. INST., https://www.aboutrsi.org/model-surveys (last 
visited Dec. 11, 2018).  
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol71/iss3/4
2019]    OBLIGATION TO SUPPORT MEASURED TRANSPARENCY   873 
 
 
complaints, and a majority of the task force also recommended a process to 
monitor the performance of credentialed mediators.
171
 Over the years, 
additional efforts have been undertaken by the ABA Section of Dispute 
Resolution’s Court ADR Committee, the Section’s Mediation Committee, 
various law schools, and university-related centers to encourage the 
collection of feedback and standardized data.  
Notably, some individual court-connected and non-profit community 
mediation programs have collected data and undertaken evaluation to 
improve their services, sometimes on their own initiative, and other times 
as a result of funders’ requirements.172 However, it is primarily the Model 
Standards’ muted endorsement of transparency and accountability as 
expressed in the combination of Standards XI and IX that has played out in 
practice. Most mediators and commercial dispute resolution organizations 
have expressed relatively little interest in participating in evaluation and 
research.
173
 In general, therefore, the efforts to encourage data collection, 
evaluation, and transparency have had little effect.  
This paucity of data has mattered. In 2012, the California Legislature 
tasked the California Law Revision Commission with determining whether 
a potential revision to the Evidence Code, creating an exception to 
                                                                                                                 
 171. See ABA SECTION OF DISP. RESOL. TASK FORCE ON MEDIATOR CREDENTIALING, 
FINAL REPORT (Aug. 2012); see also PRINCIPLES FOR ADR PROVIDER ORGANIZATIONS, supra 
note 121, at 7 (Principle 1, Quality and Competence of Services) (“The ADR Provider 
Organization should take all reasonable steps to maximize the quality and competence of its 
services, absent a clear and prominent disclaimer to the contrary. . . . The ADR Provider 
Organization’s responsibilities under this Principle are continuing ones, which requires the 
ADR Provider Organization to take all reasonable steps to monitor and evaluate the 
performance of its affiliated neutrals.”). Principle VI also provides for complaint and 
grievance systems. 
 172. See Leonard L. Riskin & Nancy A. Welsh, Is That All There Is?: “The Problem” in 
Court-Oriented Mediation, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 863, 927 (2008) (lauding those court-
connected mediation programs that collect and use evaluation data); see also ADMIN. OFFICE 
OF THE CTS., NEB. OFFICE OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION, 2016/2017 ANNUAL CASELOAD REPORT 
(n.d.), https://supremecourt.nebraska.gov/sites/default/files/2016-2017-ODR-Annual-Report. 
pdf (reporting on case volume, referral sources and case dispositions of mediations handled 
by Office of Dispute Resolution-approved mediation centers). 
 173. See Christopher Honeyman, Barbara McAdoo & Nancy A. Welsh, Here There Be 
Monsters: At the Edge of the Map of Conflict Resolution, in THE CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
PRACTITIONER: MONSTERS IN THE WATERS: FEAR AND SUSPICION DIVIDE THE FIELD OF 
CONFLICT RESOLUTION 1 (Office of Dispute Resolution, Ga. Supreme Court, 2001) 
(monograph) (describing challenges in collaborations between researchers and dispute 
resolution providers to conduct evaluations and empirical research). 
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mediation confidentiality, might negatively affect court-connected 
mediation. The Commission conducted a multi-jurisdictional, 
comprehensive review of court-connected mediation and reported: “It is 
clear that mediation is well-established in California. There are many 
mediators, lots of mediation programs, and numerous mediations. 
Nonetheless, precise statistical information appears to be scarce.”174 In 
considering the lack of data on court-connected mediation in California, the 
Commission observed:  
[E]mpirical research on mediation issues involves significant 
challenges. The effectiveness of mediation could be measured in 
a variety of ways; there is no standardized, broadly accepted, and 
readily administered measuring technique. Collecting data on 
mediation programs and analyzing such data is . . . expensive, 
slow, time-consuming, and hard to finance when state budgets 
are tight and data collection would divert funds and resources 
away from direct provision of services to the public. In addition, 
“sound empirical data is necessarily hard to obtain given the 
confidential nature of most mediation.” In fact, it is even hard to 
learn how many mediations occur.
175
 
                                                                                                                 
 174. CAL. LAW REVISION COMM’N, RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MEDIATION 
CONFIDENTIALITY AND ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE AND OTHER MISCONDUCT (PRE-PRINT 
RECOMMENDATION) 105 (Dec. 2017) (emphasis added) (citing the online information 
provided by California counties regarding their court-connected ADR programs). Elsewhere, 
the Commission notes that “it is even hard to learn how many mediations occur.” Id. at 92. 
 175. Id. at 91-92 (citing Gregory Jones, Fighting Capitulation: A Research Agenda for 
the Future of Dispute Resolution, 108 PENN. ST. L. REV. 277, 302-04 (2003) (“I have found 
little in the way of measurement of dispute resolution processes, with the notable exception 
of the ex post participant satisfaction surveys that have become so common. . . . Efforts at 
standardization and consistency in the collection and reporting of longitudinal data are 
desperately needed.”); Bobbi McAdoo, All Rise, The Court Is in Session: What Judges Say 
About Court-Connected Mediation, 22 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 377, 430 (2007) (“In this 
era of severe budget constraint encompassing the fiscal environment in state and federal 
government, great creativity will be needed to generate effective systems to monitor and 
evaluate ADR programs.”); Ignazio J. Ruvolo, Appellate Mediation—“Settling” the Last 
Frontier of ADR, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 177, 188 n.23 (2005) (“[S]ome programs have been 
required to limit the resources devoted to the collection of data, thereby making the process 
of drawing conclusions about the reasons for programmatic success somewhat more 
conjectural than might be desirable.”); Peter Robinson, An Empirical Study of Settlement 
Conference Nuts and Bolts: Settlement Judges Facilitating Communication, Compromise, 
and Fear, 17 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 97, 102-03 (2012) (California judicial officers were 
 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol71/iss3/4
2019]    OBLIGATION TO SUPPORT MEASURED TRANSPARENCY   875 
 
 
Rather than transparency, procedural fairness, or self-determination, 
confidentiality arguably has emerged as the defining feature of 
mediation.
176
 At times, mediators’ commitment to confidentiality—
exacerbated by legislatures’ and courts’ interpretation and application of the 
mediation privilege—has even demonstrated the potential to enable bad 
behavior by parties and lawyers in mediation.
177
  
                                                                                                                 
surveyed on settlement practices in 2000-2004, but results were published in 2012); Jeffrey 
W. Stempel, The Inevitability of the Eclectic: Liberating ADR from Ideology, 2000 J. DISP. 
RESOL. 247, 250; see also Coben & Thompson, supra note 4, at 52 n.18 (“Since many 
mediations are private matters, it is difficult to determine the number of mediations 
conducted in any jurisdiction.”); Jones, supra, at 283 (“Given the importance of process 
integrity and confidentiality, how can we measure the performance of alternative dispute 
resolution programs, particularly those that are connected to our formal systems of 
justice?”); id. at 303 (“We do not even have a good idea about how many mediations are 
conducted each year.”); Art Thompson, The Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Civil 
Litigation in Kansas, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 351, 354 (2003) (“[M]uch of the ADR that 
takes place is never reported.”).  
The Commission also noted that: 
In 2003, an ABA task force developed a list of data fields the courts could use 
to determine what ADR data to capture. “The hope [was] that with more similar 
data collection across court systems, there [would] be more ability to discern 
the impact of ADR on the justice system as a whole.” 
CAL. LAW REVISION COMM’N, supra note 174, at 92 n.510 (quoting McAdoo, supra, at 428 
n.270). The Commission also cited Donna Shestowsky, Disputants’ Preferences for Court-
Connected Dispute Resolution Procedures: Why We Should Care and Why We Know So 
Little, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 549, 592 n.158 (2008), and observed that “[i]t is not 
clear to the Commission whether the ABA effort has had much impact; as best we can tell 
from extensive reading in the area, the measurement problem persists.” CAL. LAW REVISION 
COMM’N, supra note 174, at 92 n.510. The Commission further observed that “[i]n 
California, the Judicial Council similarly prepared a model survey for trial courts to use in 
collecting ADR data. The Commission does not have information on how extensively the 
trial courts have used the model survey.” Id.  
The Commission also noted: “Long-term follow-up (such as checking whether a 
settlement proves durable) is particularly prohibitive.” Id. at 92 n.511 (citing Lynn 
Kerbeshian, ADR: To Be Or . . . ?, 70 N.D. L. REV. 381, 400 (1994) (“[L]ong-term follow-
up is nonexistent.”). 
 176. See Resnik, The Contingency of Openness, supra note 2, at 1683-85 (reporting that 
research regarding courts’ rules revealed that, “to the extent rules address the public or third 
parties, the purpose is generally to ensure confidentiality. As currently practiced, ADR 
makes most of its processes and outcomes inaccessible. Even as ADR takes place inside 
courthouses, it is generally outside the public purview and it displaces public adjudication.”).  
 177. See Nancy A. Welsh, Musings on Mediation, Kleenex, and (Smudged) White Hats, 
33 U. LA VERNE L. REV. 5, 14-18 (2011). 
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However, there are examples of courts and legislatures requiring 
confidentiality to co-exist with measured transparency in order to promote 
accountability and public trust in the integrity and quality of mediation. 
Perhaps the most notable example involves foreclosure mediation, marked 
by significant power disparities between repeat-player mortgage holders 
(i.e., banks, loan servicers) on one hand and unsophisticated homeowners 
on the other hand.
178
 In this context, many states have chosen to require 
mediator reports regarding the achievement of settlement, the terms of such 
agreements, and parties’ compliance with the program’s requirements (e.g., 
authority to settle, document provision, timeliness, etc.).
179
 Some states 
have then made certain information public, while protecting confidentiality 
in individual cases.
180
 The Nevada Supreme Court, for example, decided to 
“issue[] a report detailing lender compliance with the program’s statutory 
requirements,” including attendance at mediation, production of required 
documents, authority to negotiate, and good-faith participation.
181
 Other 
states have published aggregate information regarding foreclosure 
mediation settlement rates and the types of outcomes achieved.
182
 There 
have been calls for foreclosure mediation programs around the country to 
collect consistent metrics in order to permit cross-jurisdictional evaluation 
                                                                                                                 
 178. See Nussbaum, ADR’s Place, supra note 148, at 1889, 1893 (pointing out how the 
entrance of new players in the mortgage market, with different incentives, undermined the 
effectiveness of the procedural safeguards that had existed in the foreclosure process); Jill S. 
Tanz & Martha K. McClintock, The Physiologic Stress Response During Mediation, 32 
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 29, 52 (2017) (discussing the stress likely experienced by 
borrowers in foreclosure mediation). 
 179. See Alan M. White, Foreclosure Diversion and Mediation in the States, 33 GA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 411, 443-50 (2017) (discussing various states’ reporting requirements for 
foreclosure mediation, as well as the reporting provided for in “foreclosure resolutions” 
pursuant to the provisions of the Uniform Home Foreclosure Procedures Act, and their 
interaction with the confidentiality protections of the Uniform Mediation Act). 
 180. See Nussbaum, ADR’s Place, supra note 148, at 1936-37, 1950-51. 
 181. Id. at 1946 (citing Foreclosure Mediation Program, supra note 148 (detailing the 
extent to which the six primary loan servicers in Nevada (Bank of America, Wells Fargo, JP 
Morgan Chase, Ally/GMAC, US Bank, CitiGroup) and others complied with statutory 
requirements of the state foreclosure mediation program)). 
 182. See id. at 1951; see, e.g., Mónica Tabales Maldonado & Alberto Tabales 
Maldonado, Compulsory Mediation in Cases of Mortgage Execution: Origin, Effect and 
Interrelation with the Loss Mitigation Process, 9 UNIV. P.R. BUS. L.J. 36, 46 (2018), 9 No. 1 
UPRBLJ 36 (Westlaw) (English translation of Spanish-langugage title). 
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and the development of best practices.
183
 There have not been calls for an 
end to the current level of transparency. 
It is therefore time for the Model Standards to acknowledge that in 
certain contexts—i.e., when mediation is imposed by a court, legislature, or 
contract of adhesion, and mediation’s outcomes are granted expedited 
enforcement, with scant judicial review—there is an ethical obligation to 
support measured transparency.  
V. Options for the Recognition of an Ethical Obligation to Support 
Measured Transparency 
At this point, it appears that there are at least three different options for 
acknowledging a duty to the public and the value of transparency. 
A. Revision of the Current Model Standards 
The first, most obvious option is to revise the current Model Standards. 
Many years have passed since the last revision, and mediation practice has 
inevitably evolved. As noted supra, revision of the Model Standards has 
already been proposed and is being considered. This revision could be made 
as part of a larger package. 
Standard IX, “Advancement of Mediation Practice,” already 
acknowledges and provides some support for mediators’ role in developing 
knowledge regarding the practice of mediation in order to advance its 
quality. This standard could be revised—to recognize a duty to the public 
and to affirm the value of measured transparency—as follows: 
A mediator should shall act in a manner that advances the 
practice of mediation and public confidence in it. A mediator 
promotes this Standard by engaging in some or all of the 
following:  
                                                                                                                 
 183. See Nussbaum, ADR’s Place, supra note 148, at 1950-51 (citing MELANCA CLARK 
& DANIEL OLMOS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FORECLOSURE MEDIATION: EMERGING RESEARCH 
AND EVALUATION PRACTICES (2011), http://www.justice.gov/atj/foreclosure-mediation.pdf) 
(noting recommendations of a working group convened by the U.S. Department of Justice to 
permit evaluation); see also Jennifer Shack & Hanna Kaufman, Promoting Access to Justice: 
Applying Lessons Learned from Foreclosure Mediation, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2016, at 
16 (observing the importance of collecting information in order to monitor the effectiveness 
of the foreclosure mediation program); Adam Zimmerman, The Bellwether Settlement, 85 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2275, 2281-88 (2017) (describing how anonymous information from 
bellwether mediations were used to achieve a global settlement). 
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 1. Fostering diversity within the field of mediation.  
 2. Striving to make mediation accessible to those who elect to 
use it, including providing services at a reduced rate or on a pro 
bono basis as appropriate.  
 3. Participating in research when given the opportunity, 
including obtaining participant feedback when appropriate.  
 4. Participating in outreach and education efforts to assist the 
public in developing an improved understanding of, and 
appreciation for, mediation.  
 5. Supporting and complying with reporting requirements that 
assist the public in developing an improved understanding of, 
and appreciation for, mediation and its outcomes while also 
protecting the anonymity of the parties and abiding by their 
reasonable expectations regarding confidentiality.  
 6. Assisting newer mediators through training, mentoring and 
networking.  
Revision of the Model Standards will require cooperation from the three 
organizations that adopted the 2005 version—the ABA, AAA, and ACR. 
That alone suggests one of the most significant challenges posed by this 
option. Many within these organizations see no need for revisions to the 
Model Standards. In addition, in the thirteen years since the adoption of the 
2005 Model Standards, the number of mediators and mediation 
organizations has mushroomed. At least some of these individuals and 
organizations will want to be consulted as part of any initiative to revise the 
Model Standards. These additional voices and viewpoints will make the 
revision process even more complex.  
Further, as noted supra, many courts, agencies, and organizations have 
relied upon the 1994 and 2005 Model Standards as the templates for their 
own ethical requirements, and they may resist revisiting them. In addition, 
many mediators are unlikely to perceive a sufficient need for such 
wholesale revisions. Indeed, some commentators have already expressed 
such views.
184
  
                                                                                                                 
 184. See Ty Holt, Judith Meyer, Susan Podziba & Sharon Press, On Professional 
Practice, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 2017, at 35.  
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Revision of the current Model Standards may represent the best option in 
an ideal world, but it would present very real logistical and political 
challenges.  
B. The Addition of Commentary to the Current Model Standards 
Another option is to supplement the current Model Standards with 
Explanatory Comments, as is done in other contexts.
185
 Such Explanatory 
Comments could consider the application of various standards to mediation, 
particularly when the process is imposed upon people by the courts or 
pursuant to mandatory pre-dispute mediation clauses in contracts of 
adhesion. As this Article has suggested, the imposition of mediation, 
accompanied by de facto limits on judicial review and expedited judicial 
enforcement, could trigger a second and more demanding interpretation of 
the Preamble’s reference to “public confidence in mediation,” various 
standards’ declaration of the importance of protecting the integrity and 
quality of the process, and the provisions of Standard IX, “Advancement of 
Mediation Practice.”  
The key question with this option is whether an Explanatory Comment 
will have any meaningful effect. The ABA Section of Dispute Resolution’s 
Committee on Mediator Ethical Guidance produces advisory opinions on 
the application of the Model Standards, with a similar goal of influencing 
practice while avoiding the logistical and political challenges of revising the 
black letter. The Committee on Mediator Ethical Guidance issued its first 
advisory opinion on August 6, 2007, and has continued to issue advisory 
opinions.
186
 Although there are occasional references to these opinions,
187
 it 
is not clear that they have had a significant effect on mediation practice. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 185. See Memorandum from Samuel Jackson to ABA Section of Dispute Resolution 
Council (on file with author). 
 186. See Committee on Mediator Ethical Guidance, AM. BAR ASS’N, https://web.archive. 
org/web/20160701050402/http://apps.americanbar.org/dch/committee.cfm?com=DR018600
&edit=1 (last visited Jan 13, 2019). 
 187. See, e.g., Robert Kirkman Collins, The Scrivener’s Dilemma in Divorce Mediation: 
Promulgating Progressive Professional Parameters, 17 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 691, 
701 (2016) (regarding mediators’ drafting of settlement agreements); Sharon Press & Paul 
M. Lurie, Protecting Self-Determination in Mediation, GPSOLO MAG., July/Aug. 2014, 74, 
75 (recommending that mediators turn to the Committee for advice on the effect of 
evaluation on self-determination). 
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C. The Creation of Customized Standards for “Imposed Mediation” 
Although the Model Standards purport to apply to all forms of 
mediation, there are also customized ethical standards that have been 
developed for particular areas of mediation practice. According to the 
Reporter’s Notes, the joint committee that developed the 2005 Model 
Standards anticipated such developments.
188
  
One example of customized standards is the Model Standards of Practice 
for Family and Divorce Mediation (“Family Model Standards”), referenced 
supra. Unlike the Model Standards, the Family Model Standards require 
family mediators to engage in various affirmative actions: “assist[ing] 
participants in determining how to promote the best interests of 
children,”189 “recogniz[ing]” family situations involving child abuse or 
neglect and domestic abuse, “and tak[ing] appropriate steps to shape the 
mediation process accordingly.”190 The Family Model Standards also 
require mediators to suspend or terminate mediations when the “mediator 
reasonably believes that a participant is unable to effectively participate or 
for other compelling reasons.”191 Two possible reasons are when “the 
participants are about to enter into an agreement that the mediator 
reasonably believes to be unconscionable”192 or when “a participant is using 
the mediation process to gain an unfair advantage.”193 These provisions go 
                                                                                                                 
 188. The Reporter’s Notes, under Guiding Principles, provide: 
The members of the Joint Committee adopted the following principles to 
govern their work: . . . B. The Standards should retain their original function of 
serving as fundamental, basic ethical guidelines for persons mediating in all 
practice contexts while simultaneously recognizing that mediation practice in 
selected contexts may require additional standards in order to insure process 
integrity. 
Reporter’s Notes, supra note 162, at 2. 
 189. Ass’n of Family & Conciliation Courts, Model Standards of Practice, supra note 
167, at Standard VIII. 
 190. Id. at Standards IX and X. 
 191. Id. at Standard XI. 
 192. Id. at Standard XI.A.4. 
 193. Id. at Standard XI.A.6; see also Code of Professional Conduct, supra note 168, at 
Standard 4.3.2, Termination of the Process. 
Mediators shall withdraw from a mediation if a negotiation among the parties 
appears to be moving toward an unconscionable or illegal outcome. An 
unconscionable outcome is one which is the product of undue pressure, 
exploitation or duress. An unconscionable outcome reflects one party’s 
exploitation of an existing power imbalance to the degree that the resulting 
agreement “shocks the conscience” and violates accepted legal and cultural 
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well beyond those contained in the Model Standards applicable to all 
mediators. As discussed supra, the Family Model Standards also reference 
principles for the regulation of mediators and court-connected family 
mediation programs. Particularly relevant are the standards that continue to 
protect confidentiality in individual cases but provide for monitoring, 
aggregate reporting, and measured transparency in order to ensure 
mediation quality and consumer protection.
194
  
As discussed supra, the specialized area of foreclosure mediation has 
also developed a rebalancing of transparency and confidentiality. Although 
there are not customized ethical standards for foreclosure mediators, state 
statutes and court rules have created a sort of workaround to the 
confidentiality restrictions that might otherwise apply.  
The option of creating customized ethics standards for “imposed 
mediation” is very appealing. It would acknowledge that mediation 
occurring pursuant to mandates by courts, legislatures, or contracts of 
adhesion is different, and that its circumstances require a heightened level 
of public accountability. Thus, there is a need for a targeted, tailored 
rebalancing in this context between transparency and confidentiality. The 
Family Model Standards could serve as both precedent and template.  
This option likely would encounter its own logistical and political 
challenges, but they should be much fewer than those that would occur with 
an attempt to engage in a wholesale revision of the Model Standards. Thus, 
from a cost-benefit perspective, this is the strongest option. It responds to 
the particular circumstances that require increased transparency, avoids 
encroaching on other areas of mediation practice, and is the most likely to 
be adopted and implemented. 
  
                                                                                                                 
norms of fairness. 
Id. 
 194. Ass’n of Family & Conciliation Courts, Model Standards of Practice, supra note 
167, ¶ C (at end); see also Lydia Nussbaum, Mediator Burnout, 34 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. 
RESOL. (forthcoming, on file with author) (manuscript at 46) (also concerned about 
mediation quality) (“[C]ourt administrators who oversee mediation staff or a roster of 
contract mediators could adopt a policy to define efficiency not by settlement rates but by 
other metrics, such as party perceptions of fairness and satisfaction with the process, which 
would require a commitment to use appropriate survey instruments to gather parties’ 
feedback. Or, judges could adopt new court rules that would require all judges to include, in 
a prove-up of any mediated agreement, questions to assess whether the parties felt pressured 
to settle by the mediator and rejecting agreements where parties say ‘yes’.”). 
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Conclusion 
In reviewing and deciding to support the CFPB’s Arbitration Reporting 
Proposal, the ABA Section of Dispute Resolution found the benefits of the 
Proposal to be three-fold. First, the availability of redacted filings and other 
information was intended to equalize to some degree the knowledge of “one 
shot” users of consumer arbitration in comparison to “repeat players.” The 
Section concluded that such knowledge was likely to assist these “one shot” 
users as they considered whether to pursue arbitration, which arbitrators to 
select, and how to prepare for their arbitration proceedings.
195
 Second, the 
Section found that the availability of this information would permit public 
                                                                                                                 
 195. See generally Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on 
the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & SOC’Y REV. 95, 97-100 (1974) (noting the significant 
advantages that repeat players enjoy in comparison to one-time players—e.g., experience 
leading to changes in how the repeat player structures the next similar transaction; expertise, 
economies of scale, and access to specialist advocates; informal continuing relationships 
with institutional incumbents; bargaining reputation and credibility; long-term strategies 
facilitating risk-taking in appropriate cases; influencing rules through lobbying and other use 
of resources; playing for precedent and favorable future rules; distinguishing between 
symbolic and actual defeats; and investing resources in getting rules favorable to them 
implemented—and contrasting these to disadvantages borne by one-time players—e.g., more 
at stake in given case; more risk averse; more interested in immediate over long-term gain; 
less interested in precedent and favorable rules; not able to form continuing relationships 
with courts or institutional representatives; not able to use experience to structure future 
similar transactions; limited access to specialist advocates); Lisa B. Bingham, Employment 
Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL‘Y J. 189, 195 (1997); Lisa B. 
Bingham, On Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of Statistics in Judicial 
Review of Employment Arbitration Awards, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 223, 225–27 (1998) 
(observing that repeat-player employers fare better in arbitration than one-shot employees, 
that when repeat-player employers lose, damages are lower than for one-time employers, and 
generally that enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements allows employers to 
structure the arbitration process to their advantage); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 42. 
Empirical research consistently indicates that repeat players in consumer arbitration are 
more likely to “win”—but it must be noted that this is also true in litigation. See Welsh, 
Class Action-Barring Mandatory Pre-Dispute Consumer Arbitration Clauses, supra note 6, 
at 419-20 (summarizing empirical research examining the occurrence and potential reasons 
for repeat-player bias in consumer arbitration). Recent empirical work indicates that this 
pattern may have more to do with companies’ representation by lawyers who have become 
extreme repeat players, since individual consumers are very unlikely to be represented by 
lawyers who are extreme repeat players. See Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 6. There 
are now suggestions that one-shot players might increase transparency and improve their 
experience in consumer arbitration if they are trained to identify key procedural elements 
and then upload these and other information to an online platform that would be widely 
accessible. See Amsler, supra note 6. 
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oversight and enable an overall, systemic picture of the consumer 
arbitration process’s operation and effects. For example, to the extent that 
some type of systematic frequency or lack of frequency of appointment of 
certain arbitrators and the outcomes of those cases could be evaluated, 
required reporting and publication would provide a means for the CFPB 
and other public entities to engage in oversight and assessment. Third, the 
fact of disclosure would make it less likely that dispute resolution providers 
would engage in behaviors or relationships that raised doubts regarding 
their impartiality or legitimacy, and transparency would assure parties and 
the public of such impartiality and legitimacy. Ultimately, the Section 
found that:  
[T]he reporting and publication proposed by the CFPB—and the 
consequent availability of the information for those participating 
in consumer arbitration, those researching consumer arbitration, 
and those overseeing consumer arbitration—will help to protect 
the integrity of arbitration and, by extension, the integrity of the 
strong federal policy in favor of arbitration that has been 
expressed by the Supreme Court.
196
  
The Section also concluded that transparency was particularly important 
when one of the parties to a dispute was imposing a dispute resolution 
process upon the other party, and the courts might be asked to enforce, and 
thus lend their coercive power and legitimacy to, the award produced by the 
process. These characteristics of mandatory pre-dispute consumer 
arbitration in the context of financial services and products were 
particularly important to the Section as it assessed the likelihood that the 
CFPB’s proposal would assist with achieving fairness, efficiency, 
accountability, and good governance.
197
 
The Section also observed that dispute resolution organizations, 
arbitrators, and parties should welcome reporting requirements and potential 
public scrutiny. Transparency would enable analysis, improvement, and 
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comprehension
198
 of a consumer arbitration system that had been largely 
opaque.  
All of this reasoning applies just as strongly to mediation as it does to 
arbitration, particularly as mediation is being imposed by courts, 
legislatures, or contracts of adhesion, and the courts are exercising both 
deferential review and expedited enforcement of the resulting settlement 
agreements. In this context, mediators should also welcome a targeted 
rebalancing of transparency and confidentiality—“measured 
transparency”—to support the integrity of, and public confidence in, the 
mediation process. Meanwhile, the current interest in revising the Model 
Standards of Conduct for Mediators creates the opportunity to achieve such 
rebalancing through the development of a set of ethics standards 
customized for imposed mediation.  
It is time to establish dispute resolution neutrals’ ethical obligation to 
support transparency. And mediators can lead the way. 
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